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A COMPARISON OF THE SYMBOLIC FUNCTION IN DELICATE SELF- 
MUTILATORS WITH JOYCE McDOUGALL'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE 
SYMBOLIC FUNCTION IN PSYCHOSOMATIC ILLNESS AND SEXUAL
PERVERSION
by
THOMAS R. NEGRON 
Advisor: Professor I.H.Paul
The syndrome of delicate self-mutilation is reviewed 
with emphasis on the psychoanalytic interpretations that 
have been offered to explain this behavior. Thes., 
interpretations generally find a symbolic meaning in this 
symptom, while also noting the pre-verbal level of 
development that is a marked aspect of these patient’s 
functioning. The alternate hypothesis is offered that 
delicate self-mutilators suffer from a deficit in their 
capacity to create symbolic symptoms.
The work of Joyce McDougal with patients manifesting
sexual perversions and psychosomatic symptomology is 
reviewed. She hypothesizes that these patients suffer a 
deficit in their capacity for symbolic functioning, and she 
coins the notion of the "action symptom", which is a 'sign’ 
rather than a ’symbol’, to explain this deficit.
The ’sign’ and the ’symbol' are distinguished with 
respect to both psychoanalysis and philosophy.
McDougal’s notion of the action symptom is then related 
to the differing functions of the ’sign’ and the 'symbol'.
Finally, the population of delicate self-mutilators is 
compared to the population described by McDougal with 
respect to their capacity to create symbolic symptoms. The 
considerable similarity between these populations is found 
to warrant consideration of the hypothesis offered in this 
dissertation.
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There exists a group of patients who mutilate them­
selves ’delicately*: that is, their act is not life threat­
ening nor is it intended to be. This 'delicate self mutila­
tion’ takes the form of delicate, rather than coarse, 
slashes of the wrist, arm or body which usually require 
minimal medical treatment. In the psychoanalytic litera­
ture, this act is seen as one which functions to restore a 
sense of self from a state of depersonalization brought on 
by the experience of loss. It appears that there is an 
element in the act of cutting one’s self, of seeing and 
feeling the flow of blood from within, of eliciting and/or 
manipulating the attention of others, which leads to a 
communing in some unusual way with one’s self, and is 
restorative.
This dissertation will attempt to add to this existing 
literature a perspective which has not yet been applied to 
this population: the theoretical conceptualizations of of
Joyce McDougall. This dissertation will extend McDougall’s 
theoretical conclusions, based on her work with sexual 
perversion and psychosomatic personality, by applying them 
to delicate self-mutilators. The focus for applying
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McDougall’s work to this population will be her conception 
of deficits in symbolic functioning rooted in pre-verbal
trauma and noted in her patients. It is hoped that the
application of this conceptualization will both enhance the 
understanding of this particular population while, at the 
same time, it will provide one way of categorizing self-
mutilators not dependent upon behavior but upon develop­
mental level of symbolic functioning.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis I wish to explore in some detail in 
this dissertation is that delicate self-mutilators can be 
meaningfully conceptualized as suffering from deficits in 
their capacity for symbolic functioning. While this point 
has been made before (Doctors, 1979), it has not been a 
primary focus of attention. What I wish to specifically 
explore is the following conceptualization: Because deli­
cate self-mutilators suffer from deficits in their capacity 
for symbolic functioning, they are deficient in the capaci­
ty for unconscious symptom formation. Delicate self-mutila­
tion is thus an act which takes on the function of an 
unconscious symbolic symptom in relieving psychic tension.
Background for hypothesis 
Briefly, for the moment, what I am asserting is this: 
The hallmark of the neurotic symptom is that it carries 
meaning, is a metaphor, is symbolic of a repressed in­
3
stinctual striving. The symptom is a transformation; it is 
the "return of the repressed" in a transformed state which, 
in its new form, is not recognized by the ego as the 
original repressed instinct. With this “return", some dimi­
nished form of satisfaction (of the repressed instinct) may 
be experienced. Thus, the secondary "after pressure” of the 
primary repression is relieved.
In psychoanalysis the "visissitudes" of instinctual 
transformations have been carefully studied from the stand­
point of psychopathology. From psychopathological states 
one is often able to infer normalcy. However, while trans­
formations of instinctual strivings have been followed 
serially, from the unconscious instinct to its eventual 
derivative in consciousness, the actual process of trans­
formation: the function of symbolizing, has been an a
priori assumption of psychoanalysis. It has remained some­
thing of the ’black box’ of psychoanalytic theory.
A general aim of this dissertation, then, will be to 
attempt to examine the contents of this 'black box’ by 
using the symbolic function as a more central focus from 
which to view psychopathology. Joyce McDougall has examined 
two forms of psychopathology, sexual perversion and psycho­
somatic symptomology, with this idea as an important aspect 
of her conceptualization. I will apply her conceptualiza­
tions to another population: delicate self-mutilators. My
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intention is to show that McDougall*s ideas concerning the 
symbolic function can be meaningfully applied to this popu­
lation.
Introduction to The Symbolic Function 
Before continuing further I should like to make a few 
introductory remarks on the notion of both * symbols’ and 
the 'symbolic function*. (This subject will be covered in 
detail in Chapter V.) In the widest sense of the meaning of 
a symbol,
...the subject is seen to comprise 
almost the whole development of 
civilisation. For what is this [ci­
vilisation] other than a never- 
ending series of evolutionary sub­
stitutions, a ceaseless replacement 
of one idea, interest, capacity, or 
tendency by another? (Jones, 1919;P-87).
It is this idea of “substitution" and "replacement” that 
captures the major function of the symbol. For example, the 
English vocalization "chair" functions to substitute for 
the thing which is a chair in linguistic communication. The 
word ’chair’ replaces the need to have the thing ’chair’ 
present in order to communicate the idea of it. More sub­
tly, words may function to enrich meaning by evoking more 
subjective, or emotional, experience. These uses are found 
in metaphor, simile, conotation, etc. These add shadings 
of subjective experience to the basic, objective denotative 
meaning of words. An example of this use of words would be
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the phrase "sea of troubles", which adds uniquely indivi­
dual associations to “sea” (deep; stormy; limitless; etc.) 
to the idea of "troubles”. It can be seen, then, that 
symbols function in a variety of capacities; there are 
levels of symbolic activity, from basic substitutions of 
one thing for another to the figures of speech which enrich 
linguistic communication to the creative acts of the ar­
tist.
In psychoanalysis the symbol has a narrower and more 
technical definition. According to Jones (1919) the "true" 
symbol is the unconscious product of repression. From this 
perspective, only what has been repressed may be called a 
symbol. Thus any conscious use of symbols, as noted above, 
may not be called a "true” symbol. Although Jones’ defini­
tion has been critisized as being too restrictive (Eycroft, 
1956; Kubie, 1953), it will serve as a good starting place 
for the moment. In Chapter V I will examine the notion of 
the symbol in greater detail.
I shall organize what follows in this way: I will first
present two early case studies which describe different 
forms of self-mutilation: delicate and course. The differ­
ing ways each form is conceptualized will be helpful to 
begin making distinctions about how self-mutilation may, or 
may not, be symbolic. Next, I will review the psychoanaly­
tic literature on delicate self-mutilation. My focus will
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be first on the common characteristics of patients who 
delicately self-mutilate which justify calling it a syn­
drome. Next, I will focus upon the psychoanalytic interpre­
tations which have been offered to explain this behavior. 
Following this, I will then present the work of Joyce 
McDougall which relates to deficits in the symbolic func­
tion she has found in patients with psychosomatic illness 
and sexual perversions. Finally, I will apply the concepts 
put forth by McDougall concerning psychosomatic illness and 




TWO CONTRASTING CONCEPTIONS OF SELF-MUTILATION
Introduction
Before reviewing the literature on delicate self-mutila­
tion and in order to acquaint the reader with two contrast­
ing conceptions of self-mutilation which will be central to 
my hypothesis, I will first present two early papers on the 
subject. The first, The Case of Miss A, (Emerson, 1913) 
will introduce an important diagnostic issue concerning 
delicate self-mutilators. The second, a comprehensive arti­
cle by Karl Menninger (1935), will put forth a clearly 
stated conception of the symbolic meaning of the act of 
coarse self-mutilation. The difference in these two concep­
tions will be seen to be consonant with the fact that
coarse and delicate self-mutilators are indeed different 
populations.
The Case of Miss A 
The first reported case of self-mutilation in the liter­
ature, The Case of Miss A, (Emerson,1913) is a psychoanaly­
tic study of a 23 year woman who presented with "twenty- 
eight or thirty" self-inflicted cuts on her left arm,
breast and right calf. There was no question of suicidal 
intent in these injuries; rather, the cutting was a means
of gaining relief from headaches, and from a "queer feel­
ing" which she could not describe.
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Miss A’s father was a "cruel man” who thrashed his sons 
unmercifully, often stripping and tying them to a bedpost. 
Miss A lived in terror of him, although she was not thrash­
ed herself. What she feared most was being strip­
ped. Because of this fear, an uncle was able to blackmail 
her into allowing him to "do as he liked" with the promise 
not to reveal to the patient’s father an infraction of hers 
that would have angered him. Thus, the patient was mastur­
bated daily by this uncle for "five or six" years until the 
age of fourteen.
The patient’s menses began at the age of thirteen, and 
were irregular. She was told by friends that this could be 
the cause of consumption or insanity. She believed this 
because she was having severe headaches and she attributed 
them to her irregular menses.
The first incident of self-cutting occurred when Miss A. 
was about twenty years of age. While she was cutting bread 
a cousin attempted a sexual assault. The patient scuffled 
with her assailant and was cut. Two results of this imme­
diately followed: the cousin left her alone; a headache
which the patient had had, disappeared. After this incident 
the patient continued deliberately cutting, as stated ear­
lier, as a means of relieving her headaches and her "queer 
feeling". Although the cutting offered her relief, her 
attitude about it was ambivalent. In her own words,
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Then another time I had another crazy 
headache. I had tried hard to control 
myself...but I had a fight at home, my 
mother was nagging me.... I cut myself 
with a safety razor-blade four times 
before it brought any relief (p.47).
Emerson comments on the difficulty of diagnosis in this 
case. He maintains that it is “doubtful” that this case
could be called one of hysteria because of the lack of
repression. The patient was clearly able to remember her
childhood psycho-sexual traumas. However, similar to hys­
teria, according to Emerson, the patient was unable to bear 
mental distress. Emerson distinguishes between Miss A.'s
ability to bear mental and physical pain.
The patient was not afraid of [physical] 
pain, but she was unable to bear mental 
anguish. To a certain extent she chose 
[physical] pain (p.49)
Again in the patient’s own words:
The next time I was with Y- and he would 
not believe what I told him, so I took up 
my knife to show him. I just stuck it 
into my arm, he wouldn’t let me rip the 
scar open. I was indifferent. I felt 
still and baffled. I knew I must give up 
the idea of having a child [with Y], and 
it hurt, but the pain was numb (p.47).
Emerson’s comments on the treatment follow:
It was assumed that the patient has con­
siderable psychic power, only introvert­
ed. She was encouraged to believe in her
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own capacity. Each step in the analysis 
was explained and discussed with her. She 
was told some of the theories and was
asked if she corroborated them in her
feelings and thoughts. If not, they were 
revised to fit the facts. In this way she
analyzed her own complexes and thereby
gained much self-control. And most im­
portant of all, opportunity for sublima­
tion was obtained for the patient, and 
she was given a chance (p.53).
Emerson states cautiously that the patient responded 
well to treatment, having gone fourteen months without a 
relapse.
Menninger’s Conception of Self-mutilation 
Wenninger (1935) in a comprehensive article on differing 
forms of self-mutilation, excluding delicate self-mutila­
tion, states the problem in the following way:
We must try to determine the reason for 
the increased power of the destructive 
element and the reason for its direction 
back upon the self; we must also study 
the significance of the sacrifice and why 
a particular part of the body is selected 
for this function (p.408).
The neurotic uses "substitutive and symbolic" forms of 
self-mutilation while the psychotic "makes no effort at 
such concealment". Menninger understands neurotic self- 
mutilation as a compromise formation: the mutilator
punishes him/her self because of the guilt incurred by a 
forbidden indulgence, while the punishment itself
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actually permits the continuance of for­
bidden indulgences and in this way be­
comes in itself a kind of indulgence (P.415).
The "forbidden indulgence" for Menninger is masturba­
tion. Menninger sees neurotic and psychotic self-mutila­
tion as similar in structure but dis-similar in the neuro­
tic's ability to "disguise" the method of self-mutilation 
in such ways as injury at the hands of another party, or 
unnecessary surgical operations. In both, however, it is a 
compromise device which saves the personality from the 
direct assault of the instincts or the conscience.
In one case cited, a psychotic woman who had killed her
own child with her right arm later put the same arm on a 
railroad track so that the oncoming train would amputate 
it. According to Menninger, she then made a rapid and
complete recovery and has been well since.
What this woman did, therefore, was to 
substitute a self-mutilation for suicide; 
instead of offering up her life she 
offered up her arm, which was quite 
logical since it was the guilty organ. It 
was logical if one assumes the personifi­
cation or autonomy of various organs of 
the body (p.412).
Menninger posits this mechanism as an unconscious de­
vice for relieving guilt. In another case cited, the self- 
mutilation was neurotically disguised, taking the form of 
extremely severe nail-biting. Although the biting resulted
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in -tearing off of nails and infection, no pain was experi­
enced. Menninger sees -this indifference to pain as similar 
to that seen in hysterics
who can be moved so strongly by psy­
chological motives as to be unmoved by 
physical sensation accompanying their 
self-mutilative acts (p.414).
To summarize Menninger*s conception of self-mutilation, 
he posits a continuum from a disguised (neurotic) symbolic 
substitute to an unconcealed (psychotic) destruction of an 
offending part. The power of the destructive element is 
turned back upon a part of the self. In this way, the part 
is sacrificed for the whole. This compromise saves the 
whole (differentiating self-mutilation from suicide) while 
relieving guilt through the punishment of the part. The 
mutilated part symbolically represents the act for which 
the guilt has been incurred.
Comparison of the Concepts of Emerson and Menninger 
The different views expressed in these two early papers 
highlight the primary focus of this dissertation, which is 
the role of the symbolic function in relation to symptom 
formation in delicate self-mutilation. Emerson noted a 
diagnostic dilemma in attempting to fit his patient’s symp­
toms into a model of hysteria (the return of repressed 
material in symbolic somatic form: conversion reaction)
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First, there did not appear to be repression of the trauma­
tic events: Miss A. clearly remembered these events. Se­
cond, she experienced continued build-ups of tension which 
hysterical patients were able to avoid through their symp­
toms: "la belle indifference". Her headaches and her "queer 
feelings" did not serve to relieve tension. Relief from 
tension was accomplished by an additional and consciously 
deliberate act: delicate self-mutilation. Included in this
was an unusual relationship to pain: she appeared to chose
physical pain over mental anguish. Further, her response to 
physical pain was expressed in terms difficult to compre­
hend: "I felt still and baffled. ... it hurt, but the pain
was numb."
Emerson’s treatment, which he appears to have sensiti­
vely geared to the capacities of his patient, resulted in 
"opportunity for sublimation" and in symptom remission. 
This capacity for sublimation is of interest, since the 
functional properties of sublimation and symbolic symptom 
formation are parallel: the symbolic displacement of in­
stinctual urges. In neurosis, the displacement is to a 
symptom, while in sublimation it is to a socially accep­
table activity (Freud, 1905). In both, however, a symbolic
activity has occurred. This means that Miss A. left treat­
ment with some capacity for tension release through symbo­
lic activity and, at the same time, was free from her
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symptom of delicate self-mutilation. This allows the infe­
rence that there is a connection between her ability to 
symbolize, and her symptom remission.
In Menninger’s formulations, based on neurotic and psy­
chotic patients, the symbolic significance of the acts of 
coarse self-mutilation are clear. The offending part is 
mutilated because it is symbolic of the act for which guilt 
has been incurred. This is the classic neurotic mechanism 
of symptom formation. In psychosis, as well, the symbolic 
function operates. The difference, as Menninger states, is 
that the substitution is not disguised.
The contrast between Emerson’s and Menninger’s cases and 
formulations serves two purposes for this dissertation. 
First, it discriminates two different populations: coarse
and delicate self-mutilators. This distinction is consonant 
with the current literature (Doctors 1979; Scheftel, 1985), 
and nothing further will be said about coarse self-mutila­
tion. Second, Emerson’s questions about diagnosis; his 
noting the capacity for sublimation in connection with 
symptom remission; and his inability to find a symbolic 
significance to his patient’s symptom, all can be seen to 
lead to the hypothesis that the symptom was not symbolic in 
Menninger’s sense. This latter hypothesis is not consistent 
with the literature on delicate self-mutilation, as will be 
seen in the following review of the literature.
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CHAPTER III PART 1 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON DELICATE SELF-MUTILATION
Terminology
While there is little agreement in the literature upon 
terminology, there is much agreement about many aspects of 
those patients who repeatedly mutilate themselves in such a 
way as to cause minimal physical harm. Many terms have been 
applied to this population: self mutilation (Offer and
Barglow, 1960; Simpson, 1976; Carroll, 1980); the syndrome 
of the wrist cutter (Graff and Mallin, 1967); wrist slashing 
(Grunebaum, 1967); wrist-cutting (Rinzler et al, 1968); the 
syndrome of delicate self-cutting (Pao, 1969); self-cutting 
(Novotny, 1972); repeated self-cutting (Siomopoulos, 1974); 
and the deliberate self-harm syndrome (Pattison and Ka- 
han, 1983). The term "delicate self-mutilation" will be used 
in this dissertation.
Characteristics of Delicate Self-mutilators 
The characteristics found in common among delicate self- 
mutilators are the following: predominance among young
intelligent women; early traumatic experience; symptom-free 
childhood; first self-mutilation after menarche; history of 
substance abuse; poor parental relationship; inability to 
verbalize affect; difficulty with sexual identity; periods 
of normal adjustment alternating with psychotic episodes. 
There is a regular sequence of events leading to self-
16
mutilation consisting of separation or loss; buildup of 
tension; depersonalization; lack of pain when self-mutila­
ting; relief after self-mutilation.
The existence of these characteristics which are regu­
larly found among delicate self-mutilators has led a number 
of workers in this area to apply the term "syndrome" to 
this population (Graff and Mallin, 1967; Doctors, 1979; 
Pattison and Kahan, 1983).
I will now review the literature for each of the charac­
teristics noted above.
Predominance Among Intelligent Young Women:
Graff and Mallin (1967) reported on 21 patients, 20 
females and 1 male. The male was excluded from the study 
because they felt he was atypical. Rosenthal et al, (1972) 
omitted 11 men from their study because the findings were 
so different they decided to present them in a separate 
paper. Unfortunately, this paper has not been published. Of 
Pao’s (1969) 27 patients, 23 were female. Similarly,
Graff (1967), Grunebaum and Klerman (1967), Rinzler and 
Shapiro (1968), McKerracher et al, (1968), Rosenthal et 
al, (1972), Simpson (1975), Doctors, 1979, Carol et 
al, (1980), and Schaffer et al, (1982), have reported a 
predominance of females in their studies.
However, Pattison and Kahan (1983) indexed 56 indivi­
dual cases in the literature and found "no significant
17
difference" in gender. They do note that this may be an 
artifact of their method of case retrieval, in that the 
literature contains confusions between low-lethal self-harm 
and highly lethal suicidal behavior as well as being 
inconsistent in psychiatric case detail. Bach Y Rita (1974) 
has reported on self-mutilation in habitually violent male 
inmates who exhibit many of the components of the syndrome 
outlined above. However, since this population consists of 
imprisoned criminals, the stress of imprisonment and 
confinement, as well as the fact of their anti-social 
behavior add psychological variables not found in the popu­
lation of delicate self-mutilators here being studied.
As to intelligence, Phillips and Alkan (1961) reported 
the case of a young woman, ’Alice', with numerous signs of 
self-inflicted injury: a seven inch scar on her face,
several smaller ones on her right temple, two large scars 
on her neck, multiple scars on her right hand and wrist, 
several on her upper left arm, evidence of deep gashes from 
her left wrist running all the way up her forearm, an 
incision on the bottom of her left foot, and an old wound 
beneath her left arm. The woman was a college graduate of 
superior intelligence who never had any academic difficul­
ty. Graff (1967) described the chronic wrist slasher as an 
attractive, intelligent woman who has usually been a top 
student in high school and has attended college. Similarly,
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Grunebaum and Klerman (1967), Rinzler and Shapiro (1968), 
Siomopoulos (1974), and Simpson (1976) report above average 
intelligence in this population.
Early Trauma
Emerson’s report of Miss A (1913), above, documented a 
history of continued sexual abuse, while Grunebaum and 
Klerman (1967) report histories of both incest and other 
forms of early trauma, concerning such events as a patient 
watching her mother being raped, or another patient having 
her father throw knives at her. Schaffer et al (1982) 
reported greater frequency of child abuse in self-mutila­
tors, as have Carroll et al (1980), Green (1978), Roy 
(1978), and Novotny (1972). A history of early illness or 
surgery is reported by Siomopoulos (1974) and Simpson 
(1975); major separations by Carroll et al (1980); and 
Kafka (1969) reported a case with such severe dermatitis as 
a child that handling was impossible. Rosenthal et al 
(1972) reported that 60% of their population of cutters had 
had surgery, hospitalization or lacerations requiring mul­
tiple sutures before the age of five.
Relatively Symntom-free Childhood
Despite the high incidence of early trauma these pa­
tients are apparently symptom free during childhood (Doc- 
ter 1979). Phillips and Alkan (1961) note that their pa­
tient (Alice) spent her childhood in boarding school where
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she always appeared to adjust well. They state, further, 
that there was no objective evidence of illness prior to 
the patient’s first self-mutilation. They do observe, how­
ever, that her self-image was poor and that she adopted the 
role of the clown among her peers. Graff (1967) states that 
people are usually impressed with the wrist-slasher's abi­
lities, but that she is often a loner and acts like one, 
thus compounding the problem. Rinzler and Shapiro (1968) 
report that the family of one of their patients was unani­
mous in describing her development as unremarkable in any 
way, and Pao (1969) states that his patients were relative­
ly free from major symptoms before puberty although he also 
notes that an expert could have detected them as troubled. 
Burnham (1969) speaks of childhood difficulties but be­
lieves that these patients have the skills and intelligence 
to negotiate difficulties until puberty evokes a regressive 
symptomology. Although histories of eating disorders 
(Asch, 1971; Simpson, 1975; Novotny, 1972; Pao, 1969; Ro­
senthal et al., 1972) and anxiety (Crabtree, 1967) are re­
ported without specific reference to age of onset, Graff 
and Mallin (1967) do state that difficulties suggesting a 
high degree of childhood pathology, including night terrors 
or uncontrollable tantrums, were noted in their patients.
From this evidence it appears that most, but not all, of 
these patients experienced a lack of overt symptomology in
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childhood, even in the presence of clear evidence of
traumatic experiences. ^
First Self-Cutting After Menarche
This finding is virtually universal in the literature:
no report has come to the attention of this writer which 
does not report the first episode of delicate self-cutting 
in women to have occurred before the onset of menstruation. 
No information about the age of first incident of delicate 
self-mutilation is available for the few male patients
reported. Other types of self-mutilation are reported to 
have occurred before menarche in girls who later became 
delicate self-cutters. For example, Rosenthal et al (1972) 
reported that none of his patients cut themselves before 
menarche, "...although several had histories of other types 
of self-mutilation by then" (p.1364). The "other types"
were not specified.
History Of Substance Abuse
In Pattison and Kahan’s (1983) recent index of 56 case 
histories found in the literature of "deliberate bodily 
self-harm of low lethality" (p.867), they report that drug 
and alcohol abuse was a "major predisposing factor" (p.869) 
to this syndrome. They found that while 36% of their sample 
were drug or alcohol abusers (20 of 56), when the under 30, 
non-psychotic group was examined, 95% (19 of 20) were 
substance abusers. It is this latter group that most close­
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ly resembles the delicate self-mutilators relevant to the 
present study. Graff (1967) discusses a predilection for 
alcohol or drugs in order to relieve anxiety. "When the 
patient is on leave from the hospital, many times she will 
head for the nearest bar and get drunk" (p. 62). Rins- 
ler (1968) observes a "desperate search for stimulation, 
with an increasing pressure of activity leading to a cres­
cendo of apparent hedonism involving sex, sky-diving or LSD 
trips". Burnham (1969) describes a patient: “With her hus­
band away on a trip she drank and overate. When deprived of 
her hours with me as well, at weekends, the tension became 
too much and she burned herself" (p.226).
Poor Parental Relationship
Every study which has gathered information on parental 
relationships for this group of patients has spoken of long 
standing difficulties with one or both parents, or of gross 
deprivation. The prototypical parental couple consists of a 
cold, domineering mother with a retiring, distant father 
(Crabtree, 1967; Graff and Mallin, 1967; Pao, 1969;
Asch, 1971; Simpson, 1976). Phillips and Alkan (1961) state 
their patient's parents were "...wealthy [and] were quiet 
and emotionally unapproachable, encouraging [the patient] 
to withdraw to the end of the room to color or draw" 
(p.425). Another type of parenting was found by Grunebaum 
and Klerman (1967). They found their patient’s early lives
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and parental relationships to be unstable, with 
illegitimacy and foster care placement common. They also 
found that the most striking feature of parental behavior 
was the open display of sexuality and aggression. In their 
study, the father was "seductive and unable to set limits. 
He is intermittently indulgent, often inadequate at his 
occupation, and frequently alcoholic". Homes broken by 
divorce or death and a striking history of maternal 
deprivation is reported by Rosenthal et al (1972).
Inability To Verbalize Affect
Offer and Barglow (1960) conducted a series of struc­
tured interviews with patients five days after they had 
self-mutilated. After being interviewed, one of these pa­
tients went to the bathroom and made superficial cuts on 
her forearm.
When discovered she smiled and said: "Oh,
I really didn’t want you to find out 
about it. It’s really nothing. I feel 
much better." She couldn’t verbalize her 
feelings. "I just cry and get hysterical 
when I try to talk" (Offer and Barga- 
low, 1960)
Graff and Mallin (1967) state that the goal of therapy 
with this population is to assist the patient to "...uti­
lize words rather than more primitive gestures" in impor­
tant relationships (p.41). They believe that these patients 
resemble pre-verbal children in that they treat words as
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"soothing acoustic phenomena" and so cannot derive comfort 
from verbal messages but only from physical ones. They 
report that the patient was often not aware of what their 
therapist was saying to them, and that they only heard his 
voice, with its tone and affect providing the needed con­
tact with him. Thus these authors understand the phenome­
non of self-mutilation as a "manifestation of a breakdown 
in this developmental system" (pp.39-40). Grunebaum and 
Klerman (1967) characterize these patients as inarticulate 
and state that they cannot or do not verbalize the extent 
of their tension. They state that their ability to 
communicate discomfort is a critical variable in 
determining whether a slash will occur. One of their 
patients described delicate self-mutilation in this way: 
"It’s like vomiting —  you feel sick and spit out the 
badness". These authors characterize this act as a "self- 
prescribed treatment that does not involve verbalizing 
feelings..." (p.529). Crabtree’s (1967) patient, a 13 year 
old girl soon after menarche, began to scratch herself on 
the arms, legs and face when she became interested in an 
older male teacher. After confiding her behavior to this 
teacher, she said, "At first he seemed very understanding 
but then he became angry and I did it all the more —  I 
don’t know why but this scratching did have something to do 
with my feelings about him" (p.93). For Podvoll (1969) the
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act of self-mutilation has two goals: an internal goal, 
which is the relief of tension (see below for discussion of 
this) and an external goal, which is a restitutive attempt 
at changing the interpersonal field. It is this latter goal 
which, for Podvoll, is usually least within conscious 
awareness and most difficult to verbalize. Pao (1969) notes 
that after the act of cutting the patient shows neither the 
ability nor desire to study the events or the conflicts 
that precipitated the act. One of his patients said of a 
young man for whom she had previously felt longing, “I 
thought no more about him; if I thought about him I’d feel 
hurt. ... I cut off the thought that related to my feeling 
abandoned but the feeling of being abandoned stayed with 
me" (p.204). Simpson (1975), in a controlled study of 24 
wrist-cutters in a hospital setting, found that 18 cutters 
and only two controls showed clear difficulties in 
verbalization.
Difficulty With Sexual Identity
Considering the history of poor parental relationships, 
described above, the present finding may come as no sur­
prise. Whichever of the two predominant types of families 
discussed: the cold and domineering mother with a distant,
uninvolved father, or the open displays of parental sexual­
ity and aggression witnessed by these patients, one might 
expect any identification with parental figures to be prob-
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lematic. This expectation is clearly borne out by the data 
which addresses these patient’s sexual identity. Graff 
(1967) and Graff and Mallin (1967) found sexual behavior to 
be an " all-or-none proposition": At least half of their
patients were openly promiscuous while a large number had 
little or no sexual contacts. In addition, the promiscuous 
patients often complained of a lack of fulfillment in 
sexual relations. They described an almost unbearable ten­
sion which could be relieved only by being held in some­
one’s arms, or by slashing. Pao (1969)states that the 
female patient’s "repugnance toward female sexuality" is an 
identification with their mother’s attitude or a result of 
parental preference for male siblings (p.197). Asch (1971) 
discusses their "characteristic promiscuity" as a "[des­
perate] need to maintain contact and closeness with their 
objects at any price" rather than a true genital sexuality 
(p.604). Rosenthal et al (1972) note that 65% of their 
population had had a negative reaction to the menarche 
(feeling unhappy, disgusted or frightened), and that almost 
half had always had irregular menstrual periods. However, 
their study did not confirm Graff and Mailin’s finding of 
an "all-or-none" stance toward sexual relations. Twenty- 
five percent of their patients had not had intercourse but 
had engaged in some sexual activity. And only 3 of 24 could 
be considered promiscuous. Never-the-less, several of their
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findings did point toward confusion of sexual identifi­
cation. Half of their female cutters drew a male figure 
first on the Draw-A-Person Test, and 65% said that they 
felt more like their fathers than their mothers. Novotny 
(1972), in one of the few specific reports of male self- 
mutilators, notes that two of his male patients mutilated 
while intoxicated. For one of them the act was precipitated 
by anxiety-producing fantasies with passive homosexual 
content. This patient felt that cutting himself proved him 
to be a man "...since he could stand pain". For the other, 
the act was preceded by a disappointment connected with a 
girlfriend. According to Novotny this patient frequently 
was very frightened by intrusive homosexual thoughts. 
Siomopoulos (1974) interprets the disgust these (female) 
patients express about adult sexual relationships as an 
"expression of their psychosexual arrest which excludes 
’the other’ from any sort of sexual gratification" (p.90). 
In Simpson’s (1975) group of 24 wrist cutters, substantial 
sexual disturbance and distress was seen in 16, and promis­
cuity in 10. Pattison and Kahan (1983) found that homosex­
uality was associated with the young, male, non-psychotic 
patient who self-mutilated a single time in response to 
situational anxiety.
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Periods of Normal Adjustment; Alternating With Psychotic 
Episodes
Again, this finding might be inferred by inspection of 
the data already presented: the intelligence, symptom-free
childhoods, school achievement and high functioning parents 
of some of these patients do give them the appearance of 
normality. This appearance is in marked contrast to the 
symptom of delicate self-mutilation. This contrast is seen 
also in their day to day functioning. Graff (1967) states, 
"Following admission ...they may do well for several weeks, 
and suddenly burst into a new episode of slashing for no 
[discernible] reason" (p.61). Grunebaum and Klerman (1967) 
state that they appear normal except when periodically 
overwhelmed by inner emotional tensions. Pao (1969) remarks 
that diagnostically these patients should be categorized as 
severe borderline states. Characteristically, the cutters 
went in and out of psychosis in a split second.
When psychotic they demonstrated 
primary process experiences.
Nevertheless, when not psychotic they 
could even pass as being normal and were 
capable of responsible work (Pao, 1969;
P.196).
Other studies which have specifically noted this pheno­
menon are Burnham (1969), Asch (1971), and Simpson (1975).
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Regular Sequence of Events Leading to Self-Mutilation 
Consisting of Separation or Loss; Buildup of Tension: 
Depersonalization: Lack of Pain When Self-mutilating;
Relief After Self-mutilation
This last finding is perhaps the sine qua non of the 
syndrome of the delicate self-mutilator in experiential 
terms, and is reported by the majority of clinical investi­
gators. This sequence of events will help to understand an 
act that, at first, appears to defy an unspoken basic self­
preserving principle of human nature. This unspoken princi­
ple maintains the boundary between two contrasting views of 
ourselves: one, from outside, as an almost unbroken, con­
toured and shaped surface of warm, smooth and sensual skin. 
The other, from inside, as a mostly unfathomable image of 
independently pulsing organs, acidic digestive juices, a 
skeleton which makes an appearance only in severe injury or 
derisively on Halloween, and a slimy convoluted mass be­
neath the brow which is said to coordinate all of these. 
This boundary between inside and outside, and often between 
life and death, is violated by these patients in the ab­
sence of a wish to die.
For these patients, the act of self-mutilation is self­
preserving. A sequence of events which begins with loss or 
separation ends with relief. It is in their response to 
this sequence of events that the necessity for this 
behavior may be found.
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Separation and Loss
Grunebaum and Klerman (1967) state that generally these 
patients slash their wrists when they face the loss of a 
meaningful person or an impasse in their personal rela­
tions. Pao (1969) concluded that, while conflicts over 
aggression precipitated acts of self-cutting, conflicts 
over being abandoned and being left behind must pave the 
way. This conclusion was based upon the treatment of a 
patient who cut herself in connection with the analyst’s 
vacation, with the departure of staff members, and whenever 
she felt abandoned. It was observed that the abandonment 
need not come from outside, but could be actively created 
by the patient, herself, by refusing to join in group 
activities, forced feelings of self-sufficiency, etc.
The idea that aggression plays a major role in this 
symptom is noted. Asch (1971) believes that these patients 
cannot be separated from objects without either exper­
iencing extreme anxiety or a profound apathetic state. Most 
of their behavior, according to Asch, consists of attempts 
to cope with violent thoughts and impulses which threaten 
to break through. Podvoll (1969) describes the inner exper­
ience of a patient as a flight from deeply dependent, even 
symbiotic, wishes toward a primitive love object to the 
reliance upon auto-erotic use of one’s own body.
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Build-up of Tension
With the experience of a separation or loss, and the 
resonance this creates with their own early experience, as 
well as their inability to verbalize, to release these 
feelings to others or to themselves, a build-up of tension 
occurs. In Graff and Mailin’s (1967) study the reasons 
given by patients for cutting was a build-up of tension 
until they could no longer control it which followed a 
minor reversal (p.38). The "mounting stress" observed by 
Grunebaum and Klerman (1967) has many similarities to de­
pression, and the patient may use the term ’sad’ or ’de­
jected’. Never-the-less, these authors distinguish this 
state from depression because the feelings of anxiety, 
anger and sexual tension experienced by these patients are 
not repressed, but conscious. They state further, that in 
their experience anti-depressant medication does not pro­
vide relief. Crabtree (1967) makes the same point about 
medication (p.93). Pao (1969) described the build-up of 
tension in his group of hospitalized patients in this way:
For reasons not known to the patient, she 
felt very tense; following a period of 
tenseness she decided to be by herself; 
while alone, the tension mounted; then 
all of a sudden, she discovered that she 
had already cut herself (p.198).
Depersonalization: Lack of Pain: Relief:
The build-up of tension leads to an altered state of
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consciousness during which the actual self-mutilation oc­
curs. Awareness, and a feeling of being alive, returns in 
connection with a sensory experience of the new wound. Pain 
usually is absent, and the tension has been relieved.
For Graff (1967) there is a constellation of symptoms 
which comprise this behavior pattern. These include not 
only the slash, but sexual promiscuity, addiction, the 
altered state in which the patient appears detached or 
psychotic, and the immediate recovery after completion of 
the act. One of his patients stated that she was unable to 
tell that she was alive during states of stress, and reas­
sured herself by cutting her arms so as to draw blood. For 
Graff, the important part of this act is the self-stimula­
tion that occurred. In Graff and Mallin’s (1967) study, 
patients not only reported a lack of pain during self­
cutting, but five actually noted that it was pleasurable. 
The lack of pain is related to "a special form of isolation 
or dissociation" by Grunebaum and Klerman (1967), who see 
the patient’s urges as the need to feel or experience 
something real, a need to end a painful state of having no 
feelings often described as emptiness and unrealness. They 
also report that most patients report a sense of relief.
The term ’anhedonia’ has been used by Rinzler and Shapi­
ro (1968) and by Asch (1971) to describe these patients. 
The term was originated by Glauber (1949) for patients who
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"fear ego impoverishment and annihilation". Rinzler and 
Shapiro (1968) see these patients as "devoid of meaningful 
object relations", failing to find pleasure except with the 
strongest stimulation, and readily complaining of "feelings 
of emptiness" (p.485). Asch (1971) sees the ’anhedonic’ 
state as " a primitive form of depression" (p.603). 
However, they do not experience depression but rather are 
not able to experience any affect except recurrent and 
severe anxiety. As noted earlier, Asch believes that these 
patients have an urgent need to deny hostility in the 
outside world as part of their continuous and desperate 
attempt to control their own violent impulses and 
fantasies. When these impulses can no longer be defended 
against, they "exhibit the specific and characteristic 
defense mechanism of depersonalization". For Asch, this 
phenomenon has two sources: First, massive unneutralized 
aggression causes an ego regression from an original 
position of poorly delineated self and object representa­
tions, leading to further dissolution of boundaries. 
Second, defensive denial and repression results in further 
confusion of the self image, since that image is based upon 
'feeling* and the repression of feeling removes even 
further the experience of ’self’ from the patient. The 
affect of this is an increased tendency to 
depersonalization, and to feelings of being ’empty’ or
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’dead’. It is at this point that cutting occurs, and
usually continues until the sight of blood produces a
relaxed and even pleasurable feeling.
In the study conducted by Rosenthal et al (1972) the
patients appeared to be aware of exactly what would end
their depersonalized state.
For some, it was a degree of pain; for 
others, it was the sight of blood; and 
for a third group it was the wound —  
seeing what was inside. Each of these 
acts can be thought of as a primitive way 
of combating the feelings of unreality 
and emptiness. ... For these patients ... 
depersonalization was a frightening ex­
perience that they brought to an end by 
cutting themselves, a nonsuicidal gesture (PP.1366-1367).
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CHAPTER III PART 2 
PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF DELICATE SELF-MUTILATION
Introduction
Now that the syndrome of the delicate self-mutilator has 
been described, I will report in more detail the specific 
psychoanalytic interpretations which have been put forth to 
explain this behavior. Most of these conceptualizations 
speak to the manner in which sexual and aggressive drives 
are repressed, distorted or displaced by taking into ac­
count the patient's early identifications, or 'object rela­
tions’. Doctors (1979) summarizes these interpretations as 
follows:
... the best known analytic formulations 
draw on traditional psychoanalytic 
formulations which link self-mutilation 
or self-injury with symbolic self- 
castration and concommitant symbolic 
sexual gratification (p.30).
The important aspects of these interpretations for this 
dissertation will be the symbolic significance imputed to 
the act of delicate self-mutilation, because these take as 
their unquestioned starting place the ability to create 
symbols that represent repressed instinctual gratifica­
tions. The hypothesis of this dissertation questions that 
assumption. After I have reviewed several interpretations I 
will briefly comment on them, so that the reader may begin 
to see the how the hypothesis of this dissertation differs
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from the symbolic interpretations now being reviewed.
Psychoanalytic Interpretations 
For Crabtree (1967) delicate self-mutilation is a parti­
cular form of sadomasochism in which the core instinctual 
issue is expressed initially in a self-enclosed way so that 
the patient takes his own body as an object. Aggressive 
fantasies are connected with castrating or mutilating fan­
tasies originally directed towards parents or siblings. The 
chief unconscious benefit is the relief from guilt, even 
while the patient secretly enjoys the crime for which she 
should earn condemnation. The early goal of intensive psy­
chotherapy, then, should be the translation of this form of 
mutilation into a object-oriented dilemma by the estab­
lishment of a "transference psychosis for which a way out 
can then be sought".
& Contradiction Regarding Repression 
Grunebaum and Klerman (1967) in a similar vein discuss 
aspects of depression, a part of which is usually concep­
tualized as an attack upon the self. They make two appar­
ently contradictory statements concerning their patient's 
ability to use the defense of repression. I will use this 
contradiction to briefly highlight the alternate hypothesis 
being offered in this dissertation.
After noting open displays of sexuality, rejection and
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aggression in -these patient's families, they hypothesize 
that the latter experiences
... led to the development of ego defects 
in the patient, involving particularly 
the repression of these impulses 
(p.528; italics added).
Later, in discussing the similarities and differences from 
depression seen in these patient's affect, they state the 
following:
While the emotional state experienced ... 
has many similarities to depression 
these feelings are characterized by a 
number of features which are 
phenomenologically different from those 
of depression. Feelings of anger, anxiety 
and tension are usually conscious. 
(p.528; italics added).
It appears contradictory that "ego defects involving parti­
cularly the repression" of aggressive and sexual impulses 
can become conscious in a state otherwise resembling de­
pression. In Freud’s (1917) description of melancholia he 
stated that the exciting causes were
...countless single conflicts in which 
love and hate wrestle together are fought 
for the object ... These single conflicts 
cannot be located in any single system 
but the DNC ... (p.168).
Freud goes on to state that it is only after depression 
lifts that the ambivalent conflicts can become conscious.
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Further, the process of depression involves the regressive 
(sadistic) identification with a lost object. As will be 
seen in Chapter V, the process of identification is central
to the process of symbol formation. Thus I would make two
points about Grunbaum and Klerman’s analysis, in anticipa­
tion of a full discussion of my hypothesis in Chapter VI. 
First, their description of repression in this group of 
patients is unclear. Emerson (1913), as we have seen, is 
clearer about the confusion in diagnosis because of a lack 
of repression. The question about the occurence of repres­
sion is important; it implies that other processes have 
occurred that provide material for repression. Second, and 
connected to this latter idea, I would question Grunbaum 
and Clerman’s hypothesis that the ego defects in these 
patients primarily involve repression of experiences at 
all. These patient’s experiences with their parents can be 
hypothesized to have led to a lack of identification rather 
than a repression of those identifications. This line of
thought will be detailed in Chapter V and Chapter VI.
Further Interpretations 
To continue with the psychoanalytic interpretations of 
delicate self-mutilation, Graff and Mallin’s (1967) deci­
sion to add touching to their therapy with these patients 
is informed by the hypothesis that the pathology seen in 
these patients is linked with the pre-verbal level of
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development. Thus, there is a lack of ability to communi­
cate conflictual issues verbally. For Graff and Mallin, 
this pathology originates with maternal deprivation re­
sulting in the regressive use of oral means to relieve 
anxiety, such as alcohol abuse and eating disorders. Deli­
cate self-mutilation serves to elicit therapeutic action 
from others, to attack the introjected punishing mother, 
and to provide needed self-stimulation to make up for the 
lack of outside stimulation. The pleasurable feeling de­
rived from cutting is the joy of punishing the deprivor: 
the introjected mother.
For Pao (1969) delicate self-mutilation is conceptual­
ized as an altered ego state to be compared with other such 
states, especially depersonalization and derealization. It 
is comparable to fugue in the surrendering of autonomous 
ego functioning to an impervious urge which is a drive 
derivative. A subsystem takes over selected ego functions. 
Dnlike fugue, there is no amnesia for the event. What is 
amnestic are the experiences connected with conflicts 
leading to the event. "Cutting seemed to be a symbolic 
expression of the denied, yet accepted, castration" 
(p.202), which explains the prevalence of this symptom in 
women. Pao sees conflicts over separation as a major fac­
tor.
Asch (1971) conceives of delicate self-mutilators as
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suffering from a primitive form of depression called *an- 
hedonia*, with the wrist cutting as a response to deper­
sonalization. Separation from important objects produces a 
severe panic and profound depression. The delicate self- 
mutilation is seen as masochistic: unacceptable aggressive 
thoughts are turned against the self. These patients at­
tract sadistic partners for the same reason. They require 
a reassurance of existing, which is found in the necessity 
of continuous feeling of immediate sensation, since they 
cannot retain this memory.
While depersonalization has the aim of 
warding off destructive impulses toward 
important objects, the cutting represents 
the return of the repressed. It is an 
actual acting out of those impulses
(p.612),
but with two modifications. The cutting is an attenuated 
version of the impulse, and the aim of the drive has been 
turned back on the self. Asch speculates upon the possible 
symbolic meaning of the cutting as an attempt to bring on 
displaced genital bleeding. The relief in seeing the gap­
ing, open wound may similarly be a part of the re-creation, 
through an identification with the aggressor, of some con­
ception of menstruation as a helplessly and passively ex­
perienced genital mutilation. He sees menarche as a double 
loss of mother: the loss of the anaclitic mother-child
relation, and the revival of the Oedipal conflict. Unlike
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the boy, the girl must now give up her mother. Because she 
is essentially narcissistic through identification, to give 
up her mother is a threat of loss of her own identity. 
Therefore she uses wrist scratching to "create the repre­
sentation of the self as a bleeding person" (p.614). Bleed­
ing then could represent the "magical attempt to regain the 
lost object, the bleeding woman, the mother, through iden­
tification" (p.614).
Novotny (1972) presents a case of incidental self-muti­
lation occurring before menarche: a patient who from the
age of 8 picked her navel until it bled and then became a 
delicate self-mutilator after menarche. For him, self pene­
tration represents symbolically the wished for and feared 
penetration by the father. The sexual wish for father is 
repressed because of castration fear and penetration fear. 
A fear of injections is also noted in his patients. The 
intensity of oral conflicts is so great that Novotny won­
ders if oral conflicts are disguised in symbols from a 
higher level of psycho-sexual development.
Siomopoulos (1974) notes excessive masturbatory experi­
mentation before puberty, which ceases at age 14 or 15. For 
him, self-cutting follows renunciation of these activities. 
Siomopoulos views masturbation as an outlet for gratifica­
tion of unconscious incestuous fantasy in that the urge to 
do violence to oneself in these cases is a "symbolic sub-
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stitute for the masturbatory act". A lack of maternal 
handling during infancy leads to self-cutting in order to 
meet the need for outside stimulation. Auto-erotic activity 
fulfilled this need in the past. Thus,
self-cutting is a
distorted form of auto-erotic activity. 
Autoerotic impulses are repressed at 
puberty and emerge as a distorted form of 
self-cutting. ... the self-cutter opens 
up symbolically ... multiple little 
female genitals ... which become avail­
able for uninhibited touching, handling 
and ... manipulation (p.90).
The dissociative process makes the continuance possible by 
eliminating from memory pain and infantile wishes and fan­
tasies.
Summary of Interpretations Relevant to Symbolization 
As can be seen, repression, identification and "symbo­
lic" processes are prominantly mentioned in these concept­
ualizations. These are the traditional psychoanalytic for­
mulations put forth to explain neurosis. However, also 
prominently mentioned are primitive and pre-verbal modes of 
dealing with tension which are not usually connected with 
neurosis, but with borderline or psychotic conditions 
(Kernberg, 1975). In the latter areas, symbol formation and 
symptom formation are different from those processes seen 
in neurosis. This has been noted often in psychosis (Arie- 
ti, 1955) and is just now being explored in borderline
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conditions, the diagnostic category most often assigned to 
delicate self-mutilators.
Two descriptions of delicate self-mutilators more in 
line with the latter are Rinzler and Shapiro (1968) and 
Graff (1967). For Rinzler and Shapiro (1968) these anhe- 
donic patients fear "ego impoverishment and annihilation". 
These authors see a severe disorder of ego functioning with 
disturbances in object relations and failure of early iden- 
tificatory processes, resulting in poor judgement, depres­
sion, and feelings of emptiness. Their inability to refer 
to a meaningful introject is seen in their rejection of 
the maxim, "I think, therefore I am" for "I feel, therefore 
I am". Confronted with anxiety they affirm the integrity of 
their body and ego in concrete ways: by proving that a
person who bleeds is alive and will be cared for. The 
symptom is in fact an effort to avoid depersonalization and 
psychosis. Graff (1967) interprets this behavior as satis­
fying a need for relief of anxiety through direct physical 
stimulation which is related to the most primitive oral 
cravings. He states that these patients are "truly little 
infants" whose needs have not been met by the world. Thera­
py aims at helping the patient to handle anxiety through 
verbal expression rather than through the non-verbal self- 
stimulating way of the infant.
To summarize the psychoanalytic interpretations of deli-
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cate self-mutilation, most authors reviewed used tradition­
al psychoanalytic formulations of neurosis, in which sexual 
and aggressive drives are repressed and/or displaced, lead­
ing to the hypothesis that the cutting represents some 
aspect of the return of the repressed in symbolic form. 
Along side of these interpretations was prominently noted 
pre-verbal and primitive drives and defenses, more in keep­
ing with Pre-Oedipal psychopathology.
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that delicate 
self-mutilators can be meaningfully conceptualized as 
suffering from deficits in their capacity for symbolic
functioning. As I noted briefly, above, the capacity for 
symbolic functioning in psychoanalytic terms requires at 
least the capacity for identifications and the mechanism of 
repression. In the next chapter, I will review the work of 
Joyce McDougall who has studied these processes in patients 
who exhibit perverse and psychosomatic symptoms, as well as 
marked deficits in their capacity to symbolize. McDougall’s 
presentation relies heavily on clinical descriptive 
material, and does not succinctly define just what a
"symbol" and and "sign" might be. To supplement this, in 
the chapter following my review of McDougall, I will 
discuss in detail the definitions and functions of symbols 
and signs. In the final chapter, I will synthesize this
material and discuss how McDougall*s notions can be mean-
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REVIEW OF JOYCE McDOUGALL’S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE 
SYMBOLIC FUNCTION IN SEXUAL PERVERSION AND PSYCHOSOMATIC
ILLNESS
Introduction
Joyce McDougall's position within psychoanalytic the­
orizing combines the 'object relations’ school, represented 
by Melanie Klein (1932) and D.W.Winnicott (1975; 1980),
with early Freudian 'drive theory' (Freud, 1905;
1911; 1915). For her, the early caretaking relationship is 
vital for the structuralization of the child's psyche, as 
asserted by the object relations school. At the same time 
she holds to the early "energic" formulation of Freud, in 
which psychic regulation of instinctual energy is the fo­
cus. To this framework McDougall adds the role of the 
symbolic function and, connected with it, a new idea: the 
"action symptom”.
McDougall's Notion of the Symbolic Function 
In the most general sense, McDougall's notion of the 
symbolic function is broad: she connects it to the main­
tenance of biological life itself. For her, pain and loss 
lead to "the ineluctable demand to create psychic objects 
that will compensate”. For McDougall, symbolic (psychic) 
objects function as a substitute for objects-in-the-world. 
Without them, pain and loss would be directly and overpo­
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weringly experienced. The structuring of the psyche, then, 
in response to physical or emotional pain is a "creative 
process" which provides a bulwark against this pain.
In the long run, in man's psychic creati­
vity may well lie an essential element of 
protection against his biological des­
truction. (1982, p.340)
In a more specific sense, the capacity for symbolic 
functioning is the "coping mechanism" which mediates the 
inevitable physical and mental pain encountered in human 
life. This inevitable mental pain arises from two major 
sources: the narcissistic mortification connected with the
primal scene, and the earlier pre-verbal "definitive loss 
of the magic breast-mother." The former loss is connected 
with the oedipal conflict and gives rise to anxiety related 
to social and sexual integration. The latter loss is con­
nected with the pre-verbal period; as such it is a more 
global menace which serves as the prototype for later 
castration anxiety. Early loss becomes a ’global’ menace 
because frustration, anxiety and conflict have not yet 
become attached to the sexual organs. That is, the psychic 
representation of the sexual organs do not play a symbolic 
role in mediating frustration, anxiety and conflict. Ra­
ther, these emotions remain directly and primally connected 
to anxiety about biological life. McDougall's position is 
that when the sexual life is symbolically represented, a
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'layer' or 'buffer' has been formed between anxiety over 
actual destruction and anxiety over sexual identity. Anxie­
ty over sexual identity is less threatening than anxiety 
over actual destruction.
Importance of Pre-verbal Period 
It is during the pre-verbal period that symbolic struc­
tures begin to form in response to pain and loss. In this 
important period, the sensate nature of human contact is 
seen by McDougall as "despatializing". By this she appears 
to address what Spitz (1965) has termed "coenesthetic" 
reception, which is neither localized nor discrete but 
takes place in terms of totalities and responds to non­
verbal expressive "signals". This despatializing factor, in 
McDougall's terminology, sets in motion the early psychic 
mechanism of projective identification, which dominates 
until language "spatializes and limits the psychic struc­
ture". Just how psychic mechanisms are set in motion during 
this stage is well explained by Klein (1930) and will be 
discussed in the following chapter.
For McDougall, language is a major force which delimits 
the child's inner and outer world. It is at this moment, 
according to her, that the infant begins to inhabit its 
soma. Traumatic disturbances before this moment may place 
the patient
on the edge of an abyss that cannot be 
represented mentally, run[ning] the risk
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of precipitating himself into acts such 
as automutilation or toxicomania, with 
suicide on the horizon as the final 
solution.(1982, p.12)
Although McDougall does not cite references when making 
this statement, it appears to be consistent with Freud's 
ideas concerning the difference between a conscious and an 
unconscious idea. For Freud (1915b), the unconscious idea 
is "that of the thing alone" while the conscious idea 
consists of the concrete idea "plus the verbal idea corres­
ponding to it" (p.134). Through this linking a "higher 
organization" in the mind makes it possible for primary 
process thinking to be succeeded by secondary process 
thinking (Freud, 1911).
Regulation of Psychic Tension
McDougall distinguishes several means of tension regu­
lation with respect to the capacity for symbolization. The 
least pathological is repression with subsequent symptom 
formation, the hallmark of neurosis (Freud, 1915a). In 
neurotic symptom formation a symbolic transformation occurs 
in which a repressed instinctual impulse "returns" to con­
sciousness in a transformed state which symbolizes the 
original repressed instinct and allows tension release.
A qualitatively different way of regulating psychic 
tension is by use of the "action symptom", a term coined by 
McDougall to point up the difference between it and the
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neurotic mechanism just outlined. The "action symptom" 
appears where repression would appear in the neurotic, and 
serves to release psychic tension through action rather 
than through repression and the consequent process of neu­
rotic symptom formation.
A related method of tension regulation is the psychoso­
matic sign, also an action symptom. An example would be 
ulcerative colitis. A psychosomatic sign is distinguished 
from a neurotic symptom by McDougall: it is "the antithesis 
of a neurosis" in that, in the absence of the capacity for 
psychic tension regulation through repression, tension is 
neither transformed (by repression) nor released through 
action. Rather, psychic tension is transmitted directly to 
the soma with an effect which may be "devastating". The 
psyche has failed to mediate psychic tension through the 
use of repression and symbolic symptom formation; ,the "ac­
tion symptom" has not asserted itself, and so the soma 
itself must provide the bulwark against pain. McDougall 
asserts that the laws of the psyche and the laws of the 
soma are different; thus the psychosomatic manifestation 
cannot be conceptualized as symbolic.
While all of these means of tension regulation are seen 
as an attempt at self-cure, McDougall notes that for some 
of the "difficult" patients whose disturbances originate in 
the pre-verbal period of their lives, defensive operations
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serve the function of protection against de-differentiation 
and loss of identity rather than against Oedipal conflict. 
Restrictive and "crazy" as these symptoms may appear, they 
will not be given up easily, for they make survival pos­
sible. In this respect McDougall emphasizes repeatedly that 
these symptoms are "creative” and life-affirming, in that 
the alternate solution could well be psychosis or suicide.
In order to understand more fully these distinctions 
I will summarize McDougall*s presentations of cases of 
sexual perversion and psychosomatic symptomology. Her focus 
is twofold: first, the meaning of these symptoms for the 
individual; second, the meaning of these symptoms from the 
metapsyehological perspective of the capacity for symboli­
zation itself. As will be seen, from the latter perspective 
qualitative differences are asserted to exist for symptom 
formation in the neurotic, the sexual pervert and the 
psychosomatic patient.
Sexual Perversion From the Perspective of the Symbolic
Function
Professor K. was an apparently well functioning acade­
mic. He viewed life as a game in which he constantly fooled 
his public into believing him competent. His presenting 
complaint was a work disturbance in completing a book. He 
also revealed in a tantalizing manner a highly detailed and 
ritualistic sexual perversion which entailed beating his
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girlfriend on the buttocks with a whip. He called these his 
“favorite games", but it soon became apparent that their 
function was to bypass the ever-present terror of being 
unmasked and condemned for an unknown act or crime.
An important aspect of Professor K's games was an im­
aginary and anonymous onlooker. It was essential that the 
onlooker watch, and equally essential that the onlooker be 
duped. This ritualized, compulsive fantasy was an indispen- 
sible thread to the patient's games. The scene always 
consisted of the punishment of an innocent victim who was 
publicly whipped. The fantasied onlooker was doubly 
fooled: the meaning of the scene which purported to be a
punishment was the very condition of sexual excitement to 
the victim; the onlooker unknowingly was an accomplice 
since the fantasy of his presence was necessary for the 
orgasm which ended the drama.
A screen memory reveals to McDougall the source of the 
patient's perversion: Professor K.'s mother had often told
him of a scene in which her father, a writer who she openly
idealized in comparison to her own husband, had chased her
through a garden with a whip in his hand. At the age of 
nine Professor K. already spent hours daily imagining this 
scene in minute detail. It is this scene which served as
the basis for his later sexual perversion.
McDougall speaks of perversion as an avoidance of the
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oedipal conflict; by -the building of essential illusions 
which must not be changed in any way. The presence of these 
illusions brings into question what may be considered 
“real" for these patients, and with this question a further 
one concerning diagnostic category: While the pervert or
fetishist may lead a seemingly 'normal* life, within the 
area of their perversion their 'normalcy* appears to give 
way to bizarre acts not easily conforming with rational 
motivation.
Diagnostically, McDougall asserts that organized per­
verse formations differ from either neurotic or psychotic 
personality structures. She classifies them as "action 
symptoms". McDougall sees the perverse act as an essential 
feature in the maintenance of these patient's psychic 
stability, functioning to keep alive their necessary illu­
sions which protect them from oedipal conflict. A factor
which characterizes the pervert is that he or she has no
choice; sexuality is fundamentally compulsive. Because the 
dominant factor here is self-reparation and omnipotence, no 
choice is conceivable. Connected with this is an often seen 
"singularly impoverished fantasy life", as well as an ego 
structure which cannot regulate a compulsion to carry into 
immediate action whatever may be imagined.
That which is missing in the internal
world is sought in an external ob.iect or
situation. for there is a vital lack or
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blank in the ego structure of the 
subject. and this in turn is due to a 
failure m  symbolization. (1982, p.60).
The failure in symbolization is, for McDougall, related 
to a loss of meaning: The meaning of both the primal scene
and the role of the father’s penis. That is, the primal 
scene and the father’s penis have been denied psychic 
representation: They have not been symbolized. Thus, in
this circumscribed area the weakening of associative links 
to these Oedipal issues tends to weaken the individual's 
relation to reality, leading to a circumscribed "psychotic 
solution". Additionally, the erotization of this solution 
allows for instinctual discharge.
McDougall asserts that certain elements of this case 
are, in her experience, essential and invariable in person­
ality structures whose balance is maintained through per­
verse sexuality. She maintains that the Oedipal situation, 
with all of its accompanying anxieties, have never been 
faced but have been circumvented. The two major defenses 
used for this purpose are disavowal, and
...the disguise of "play". These serve[d] 
to deny the primal scene through in­
venting a counterfeit couple and also to 
convert castration anxiety into its oppo­
site by treating it as a game (1982,P.41).
In a personality structure of this kind the paternal
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imago is given a negative value, while this is counter­
balanced by an ambiguous maternal imago which is invested 
with the condensed attributes of both sexes. The mother 
becomes both seductive and forbidding at the same time.
For the child, she is contradiction it­
self, the very image of perversity (1982, P.42).
Because he is deprived of the solution to the Oedipal 
conflict which allows of paternal identification, he sees 
himself as the true object of of his mother’s desire. Using 
McDougall’s metaphor, he gets a fradulent diploma
on condition that he never uses it. 
Nevertheless the fraudulent diploma, 
stolen from a repudiated father, is the 
only reference that permits him to avoid 
the "solution" of psychosis. A paper king 
with an imitation scepter, he must 
thereafter protect his identity and con­
vince others that his illusory world is 
real. Of necessity, he must deceive them 
—  the public, his sexual partner, and, 
finally himself —  in the same way that, 
in fantasy, he deceived the father.
The menacing father is thus ejected from 
his inner world ... while in the intimate 
erotic world he is endlessly duped and 
humiliated (1982, p.42-43).
The lack of identification with the paternal imago is 
seen by McDougall as resulting in a "total failure to 
symbolize a valid representation of the father’s phallus". 
Without this representation Oedipal conflicts are not sur­
mounted, but avoided. The avoidance of these conflicts
55
leads not to neurotic symptomology, which is a solution to 
anxiety which threatens sexual identity, but to highly 
circumscribed areas of psychotic-like symptomology, which 
is a solution to anxiety which threatens existence itself.
To summarize McDougall*s argument, the failure of normal 
identifications with the paternal phallus in sexual perver­
sion results in a symbolic deficit. This deficit, in turn, 
is associated with the lack of important neurotic symbolic 
structures which are vital to coping with anxiety. In 
neurosis, defensive measures, such as repression, are rou­
tinely directed against against conflictual affect con­
nected with these normal identifications. In this way, the 
defensive measures are able to divert the threat of anxie­
ty to the arena of sexual identity. Without the normal 
symbolic identifications, actual objects from the environ­
ment must replace missing symbolic ones. The anxiety about 
the loss of these replacement objects is experienced as a 
threat to actual biological survival rather than a threat 
to sexual identity (castration).
Psychosomatic Illness From the Perspective of the Symbolic
Function
Psychosomatic creations, for McDougall, are the "anti­
thesis" of neurotic or psychotic manifestations, and of the 
psychoanalytic process. In neurotic and psychotic manifes­
tations a story may be decoded in which the patient is seen
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as the "guilty victim of forbidden wishes who has met 
setbacks on the path to desire". In psychosomatic transfor­
mations no such symbolic story may be found.
Indeed, it is frequently when [neurotic 
and psychotic processes! cease to 
function that the psycosomatic (as 
opposed to psychological) illness 
declares itself. ... It is when we fail to create some form of mental management 
that psychosomatic process may take over 
(1982, p.341).
McDougall finds a "methodological error of some dimen­
sion" in psychoanalytic formulations of the symbolic signi­
ficance of psychosomatic symptoms. She quotes Garma (1950), 
who speaks of gastric ulcer in a patient as a "vengeful 
bite" connected with the patient’s need to punish himself 
for his infantile wish to bite his mother’s breast. In 
Garma’s formulation, the future ulcer patient selects harm­
ful food in order to assuage his unconscious guilt by 
procuring for himself an introjected bite to both his soma 
and his psyche.
McDougall objects to the causal relationship ascribed to 
the unconscious guilt and the ulcer by citing another 
example, a patient whose mother is black and father is 
white. In psychoanalysis, McDougall points out, fantasy 
productions tend to attach themselves to somatic events 
with ideas involving both castration and the early mother- 
child relationship. This patient lived his physical prob-
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lem, black skin, as -though it was a visible sign of castra­
tion. He attached to the physical fact of his black skin 
fantasies of a dangerous persecuting mother responsible for” 
his psychic suffering. Though these fantasy productions 
were helpful within the treatment,
... it would be absurd to hold that the castration anxiety and the early 
persecutory anxieties were the cause of 
the black skin (1982, pp.352-
353).
Psychosomatic Character Pattern
McDougall prefers to conceptualize psychosomatic illness 
along the lines of the theoretical model of the Paris 
pychosomaticians (Marty, et al, 1963). According to McDou­
gall, they propose an economic theory of psychosomatic 
transmission as well as a concept of a psychosomatic per­
sonality structure which is opposed to neurotic, psychotic 
or perverse structures. Their economic theory is closely 
related to Freud’s early theory of the ’actual neurosis’ in 
which urgent instinctual discharge is blocked in the pre­
sent. According to Freud, this kind of neurosis was not 
amenable to psychoanalysis (McDougall, 1982, p.346; Strac- 
hey, 1959). For the Paris psychosomaticians, the emphasis 
is upon an impoverishment in the capacity to symbolize 
instinctual demands, rather than upon the fact of the 
blocked discharge itself. They see blocked discharge in
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relationship to deficient representation and diminished 
affective response. Their model, like Freud's 'actual neu­
rosis’, is in complete opposition to the hysterical model 
of conversion reaction.
The failure to represent instinctual conflict symbol­
ically leads to a specific mode of mental functioning and 
may determine a "psychosomatic character pattern". This 
pattern includes five characteristics: 1) Unusual object
relations notably lacking in libidinal affect; 2) opera­
tional thinking, which refers to thoughts which are pragma­
tic in the extreme and have a psychotic resonance in the 
absence of any other manifestations of psychotic ego func­
tioning; 3) A marked lack of neurotic symptoms or character 
adaptation; 4) Facial movement, bodily gestures and physi­
cal pain appearing where neurotic manifestations would be 
expected; 5) Preliminary interviews characterized by iner­
tia because of a lack of associative material concerning 
the patient’s relationships, life experiences and illness.
In related research on babies suffering from serious 
psychosomatic illness, Fain (1971) has concluded that these 
babies have a tranquilizing rather than a satisfying mo­
ther. Autoerotic activity is blocked in these babies be­
cause their mothers have failed in their function as a 
protective shield "precisely through overindulging the 
exercise of this function". Instead of developing a primi­
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tive form of psychic activity akin to dreaming these babies 
require the mother herself to be the guardian of sleep. At 
the other extreme, Fain has found babies who create prema­
turely autoerotic objects which enable them to dispense 
with their mother. Here, the mother’s absence is totally 
disavowed through the baby’s precocious creation of its own 
protective barrier. Nevertheless, there is a serious symbo­
lic gap, in that the mother’s absence is in no way compen­
sated for psychically.
McDougall, following this line of thought, states that 
she has found her patients with psychosomatic symptomology 
to have had both types of mothering, and describes these 
mothers as performing "an addictive function". Their babies 
come to need the mother as the addict needs his/her drug. 
McDougall notes that she has seen similar imagos in pa­
tients who show acting out behavior other than addictions 
and psychosomatic “acts’’, most often in perversion and 
character patterns marked by discharge patterns.
In trying to come to terms with the 
substructure of all "action disorders", 
including psychosomatic "acts", we are in 
the area of transitional phenomena and 
are witness to the attempt to make 
substitute ob.iects in the external world 
do duty for symbolic ones which are 
absent or damaged in the inner psychic
world. (McDougall, 1982, p.370).
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Summary
For McDougall both perverse and psychosomatic symptoms 
are to be conceptualized as "action symptoms". Unlike ei­
ther neurotic or psychotic symptoms these "acts* do not 
tell a symbolic story. Bather, they signify the existence 
of a symbolic deficit. This sign function is an important 
distinction, and will be discussed in the next chapter.
In the perversion, the symbolic deficit is circumscribed 
and relates to a specific symbolic deficit in the represen­
tation of the primal scene and the paternal phallus. In the 
psychosomatic patient the symbolic deficit appears to be 
more globally related to early experiences of psychic de­
privation, resulting in a more general deficit in the 
capacity to use symbolic structures to regulate psychic 
tension. In this case, psychic tension is directly trans­
mitted to the soma.
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CHAPTER V
THE RELATION OF THE SIGN AND THE SYMBOL TO McDODGALL’S 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE ACTION SYMPTOM 
Introduction
The action symptom for McDougall is a sign. rather than 
a symbol. This is an important distinction. In order to 
fully understand this distinction it will be helpful at 
this time to look more closely at what has been written 
about the sign and the symbol as separate aspects of the 
symbolic function. An important idea relevant to this dis­
cussion is the relationship of the symbol to mental activi­
ty. This will be discussed first. Next, the developmental 
progression from action to thought will be briefly reviewed 
in order to set the stage for discussion of the distinction 
between the sign and the symbol. This distinction will be 
seen to be closely related to certain forms of activity, 
and will lead us to a clear understanding of the diagnostic 
value of the ’action symptom’ with reference to the symbo­
lic function. In Chapter VI the population of delicate 
self-mutilators will be re-examined from the perspective of 
the action symptom.
The Relationship of the Symbol to Mental Activity 
In their book, Symbol Formation. Werner and Kaplan 
(1963) put forth the premise that there is not a world out 
there which is represented by symbols, but that symbols
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themselves partake in the formation of the world of ob­
jects. For them, becoming familiar with the environment is 
not a simple mirroring; in the activity of ’knowing’, 
symbolizing enters directly into the mental construction of 
cognitive objects. The inherent duality of the symbol, in 
its function of representation, implies the conscious 
awareness that the symbolic vehicle and the referent are in 
substance and in form totally different entities. It is 
this awareness that distinguishes the directed, form-build­
ing activity inherent in the symbol from the passive recep­
tion of meaning as it is presented in what Werner and 
Kaplan label the "protosymbol".
The awareness that vehicle and referent are different 
entities develops over time, and is lacking in both normal 
childhood and in schizophrenia. In these, Werner and Kaplan 
distinguish the "protosymbol" from the true symbol. The 
protosymbol lacks the "intentional act" of representation, 
but is extremely important in the genetic processes of 
symbolization. Protosymbols become true symbols by progres­
sive differentiation of vehicle and referent, as happens in 
childhood. Conversely, true symbols may regress to pro­
tosymbols through de-differentiation of vehicle and refer- 
rent, as happens in schizophrenia.
It should be noted here that Werner and Kaplan’s defini­
tion of the "true" symbol is diametrically opposed to
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Jones’ (1916) definition, noted in the Introduction. For 
Jones, from the psychoanalytic perspective, the "true" 
symbol is one in which the meaning is unconscious. For 
Werner and Kaplan, the "true" symbol is one in which the 
distance between symbolic vehicle and referrent is clearly 
and consciously understood. This difference in definition 
is specifically mentioned by Werner and Kaplan in a foot­
note (1963, p.467). They attribute the difference in de­
finitions of a “true" symbol to the difference in their 
material from that of psychoanalysis. They see their focus 
of study to be language while, for them, the psychoanalytic 
focus for the study of symbols is dream imagery.
To return to the relationship of the symbol to mental 
activity, the importance of this relationship lies in the 
understanding that a human directedness partakes in the 
active construction, or re-presentation, of an external 
thing or event by the formation of a symbol. In distinction
to this, the meaning of the protosyrobol, or sign, may be
thought of as being presented, or given, by the undifferen­
tiated vehicle/referent itself. That is, the ’distance’ 
between vehicle and referent is missing.
The idea that symbols are intentional and expressive 
acts is echoed in the work of Piaget (1969), who states
that in development the child’s first symbols are "moti­
vated", in that they present some resemblance to the thing
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signified. He goes on to observe that the essential instru­
ment of social adaption, language, is not invented by the 
child but transmitted to him in "ready-made, compulsory" 
forms. The child, however, needs a means of self-expres­
sion, needs a
system of signifiers constructed by him and capable of being bent to his wishes. 
Such is the system of symbols 
characteristic of symbolic play. 
[Symbolic play is] an assimilation made 
possible (and reinforced) by a symbolic 
"language” that is developed by the self 
and is capable of being modified 
according to its needs (pp.58-59).
Rycroft (1956) emphasizes that symbolic and imaginative 
processes underlie the development and maintenance of the 
sense reality just as much as they do neurosis. He notes 
that the antithesis between phantasy (Segal, 1974) and 
reality, between imagined ideas and objects in the external 
world, tends to break down in the experience of the infant 
who fantasies satisfaction which is then actually received 
from the mother (Winnicott, 1945).
Repeated experiences of this overlap of 
illusion and reality will tend to attach 
the individual positively to external 
reality without disturbances ... Although 
frustration may lead to acceptance of 
reality, only satisfaction can lead to 
love of it (Rycroft, 1956; p.139).
Melanie Klein (1930) has stressed the importance of
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phantasy in the infant's ability to develop a relationship
to reality through the symbolic function. For Klein the
motivating factor in symbol formation is the anxiety re­
sulting from the subject's own sadism directed against the 
contents of the mother’s body. Defenses set up at early 
periods —  the periods characterized by McDougall in the 
last chapter as "de-spatializing" —  are directed at both 
the sadistic impulses and the objects of the sadism. The 
child's “dread" makes him equate the contents in question 
with other things which, owing to this equation, themselves 
become objects of anxiety.
and so he is impelled constantly to
make other and new equations, which form
the basis of his interest in the new
objects and of symbolism. Thus, not only
does symbolism come to be the foundation
of all phantasy and sublimation but, more 
than that, upon it is built the subject's 
relation to the outside world and to 
reality in general (Klein, 1930; p.26).
A philosopher who has emphasized the differing aspects 
of the symbolic function is Ernst Cassirer. He has written 
a three volume work, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. 
(1955) in which he exhaustively examines the symbols of 
science, language and myth. Beginning with science, he asks 
whether its symbols exist merely side by side with those of 
language and myth, or whether they are not "diverse mani­
festations of the same basic human function" (1955, p.77).
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If the latter is true, then Cassirer asserts that philoso­
phy must formulate the "universal conditions of this func­
tion and define the principle underlying it." While the 
scope of Cassirer’s goal is far beyond that of this disser­
tation, I wish to point out that his notion of the diver­
sity of manifestations of the symbolic function, encompas­
sing apparently incompatible realms such as science, lan­
guage and myth, appears to allow as well for diversity in 
individual variation of the capacity and motivation to 
symbolize. This idea is consistent with the hypothesis of 
this dissertation.
Cassirer emphasizes that cognition is only one of the 
many forms that in which the mind can apprehend and inter­
pret being. Others too, can be designated to be modes of 
"objectivation". However, their methods are entirely 
different from logical conception and logical law.
Every authentic function of the human 
spirit has this decisive characteristic 
in common with cognition: it does not 
merely copy but rather embodies an 
original, formative power. It does not 
express passively the mere fact that 
something is present but contains an 
independent energy of the human spirit 
through which the simple presence of of 
the phenomenon assumes a definite "mean­
ing", a particular ideational content. 
This is as true of art as it is of cogni­
tion; it is as true of myth as it is of 
religion. All live in particular image- 
worlds, which do not merely reflect the 
empirically given, but which rather 
produce it in accordance with an indepen-
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deni; principle. Each of these functions 
creates it own symbolic forms which, if 
not similar to the intellectual forms, 
enjoy equal rank as products of the human 
spirit. (1955, p.78)
Cassirer sees this diversity of symbolic forms as being 
directed toward the goal of
transforming the passive world of mere 
impressions, in which the spirit seems at 
first imprisoned, into a world that is 
pure expression of the human spirit
(pp.80-81).
Following the sense of these authors, then, the symbol 
can be seen to be an element of purposeful mental activity, 
whether it is activity directed toward knowing or wishing; 
whether it is an activity which is a pure expression of the
human spirit or one which is the unconscious result of
anxiety. This activity takes place at the psychological
boundary, the ’skin’, of the organism, between that which 
is within and that which is without. The symbol is an 
individually unique and creative integration of these two 
poles of experience (Kubie, 1953). This activity can be 
seen in its formative stage in what Winnieott (1953) has 
called the "transitional object", which exists at the 
border of "me" and "not-me", and is the creation of the 
child alone. The function of integrating this duality is
reflected in the very structure of symbols, having an
objective pole in the thing to be represented and a subjec­
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tive pole in the choice of representational vehicle. The 
use of symbols is, in a broad sense, an integral part of 
that which distinguishes humankind from the animal world 
(Langer, 1942). The lack of differentiation of vehicle and 
referent in symbol formation, in the narrow sense, has been 
seen to be normal in childhood, and indicative of extreme 
pathology, as in the de-differentiation between vehicle and 
referent observed in schizophrenia.
The Developmental Progression From Action to Thought
Now that the purposeful mental activity inherent in sym­
bol formation has been discussed, I wish to continue to the 
second idea I introduced: a brief review of the develop­
mental progression from action to thought. This discussion 
will lead us to the relation of signs to symbols, and will 
form the basis for fully understanding the implications in 
McDougall’s notion of the "action symptom", and to applying 
it to delicate self-mutilators.
A complete review of the developmental progression from 
action to thought is far beyond the scope of the present 
work. This idea is a central one to all developmentally 
oriented branches of the social sciences. Therefore I will 
briefly review the work of several representative theorists 
before discussing the distinction between the sign and the 
symbol in this developmental progression.
Piaget (1962) traces the transformation of action to
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"thought by meticulously following two separate developmen­
tal lines, play and imitation, from their infantile begin­
nings in reflex activity to the "internalization" of action 
into fully representational and symbolic thought. For Pia­
get, assimilation and accommodation are two complementary 
functions which integrate and modify internal "schemas" of 
action to both the demands of reality and of fantasy, the 
latter in the form of symbolic play. Piaget specifically 
notes the "internalization" of action schemas and the con­
sequent delay between perception and action indicative of 
representational thought. These ideas are central to psy­
choanalysis as well.
For Freud, the delay between sensation and action is 
mediated by language and thought. Freud wrote that
Restraint of motor discharge (of action)
... was provided by means of the process 
of thought, which was developed from 
ideation. Thought was endowed with 
qualities which made it possible for the 
mental apparatus to support increased 
tension ... (Freud, 1911; p.16).
A philosopher, Sussane Langer, (1942) has studied this 
progression from the specific vantage of role of the sym­
bol. For her, by the interpolation of symbols into the gaps 
and confusions of direct experience man is able to synthe­
size, delay, and modify his reactions. For Langer, man’s 
"conquest of the world" rests upon this supreme develop­
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ment.
The basic need, which certainly is 
obvious only in man, is the need of 
symbolization. The symbol-making function 
is one of man's primary activities, like 
eating, looking or moving about (p.32).
For Langer, symbolization is an act necessary to thought 
and prior to it. She conceptualizes the function of the 
brain as a transformer rather than a switchboard. For her, 
the brain transforms the current of experience which passes 
through it into a stream of symbols, and these symbols are 
transformed into ideas: a typically human function thus
finds a typically human form of overt activity.
Distinction Between Sign and Symbol
The distinction between the sign and the symbol which I 
will use is taken in large part from Langer's (1942) work, 
to which I have already referred. There is not full agree­
ment in the literature as to this distinction. For alter­
nate views see Piaget, (1962); Alston, (1967); Reieh- 
bart (1983).
For Langer the sign is "something to act upon" while the 
symbol is “an instrument of thought" (1942, p.51). A sign 
indicates part of some larger process in which the sign is 
part of the referent. This reminds us of Werner and Kap­
lan's distinction between 'symbol' and ’protosymbol’, in 
which the awareness between symbolic vehicle and referent
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is missing in the protosymbol. This implies that for an act 
of representation the subject must be taken into considera­
tion. For the sign, there are three essential terms: the
subject, the sign and the object. The 'meaning' of the sign 
for the subject is the existence of the signified. The sign 
is thus the basis of animal intelligence, in that a sight, 
smell, sound, etc. signals the existence of the rest of the 
situation. For an animal, the smell of humans signifies 
part of an existing situation, for example, the danger from 
hunters. The sign is a signal of the existence of the rest 
of the situation. It signals the existence, past, present 
or future of a thing, event or condition. The misinterpre­
tation of a sign is the most simple form of mistake, lead­
ing to the experience of disappointment. As a corollary to 
this the sign is, itself, the most simple form of know­
ledge.
A term used symbolically, rather than signally, "...does 
not evoke action appropriate to the presence of its object" 
(p.48). Symbols are not proxy for their objects, but are 
vehicles for the conception of objects. In talking about 
things we have the conception of them, not the things 
themselves in mind. Behavior towards conceptions is what 
words normally evoke; this is the typical process of think­
ing (p.49).
For the symbol there must be four essential terms: the
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subject, symbol, conception, and object. This is, strictly, 
a different function than the sign. Thus, the perception of 
the word “Napoleon" does not evoke action consonant with 
the past, present or future existence (appearance) of Napo­
leon, but evokes the conception of Napoleon; no overt 
action is called forth. The ’action' is an act of concep­
tion, not of overt motility.
Symbols are not proxy for their objects, 
but are vehicles for the conception of 
objects. To conceive of a thing ... is 
not the same thing as to “react towards 
it" overtly, or to be aware of its 
presence. In talking about things, we 
have conceptions of them, not the things 
themselves; and it is the conceptions, 
not the things, that symbols directly 
"mean". Behavior toward conceptions is 
what words normally evoke; this is the 
typical process of thinking, (p.49)
Application of the Distinction Between the Sign and the 
Symbol to the Action Symptom 
In McDougall’s latest writing concerning "neosexuali­
ties" (perversions), action symptoms are described as
... psychic organizations that attempt to 
resolve the conflicts in the inner world 
by some form of action in the external 
world. This obligation to act indicates a 
certain failure in symbolic functioning 
... action takes the place of containing, 
feeling, and thinking (1985, p.279).
This action which replaces "containing, feeling, and think­
ing" and is symptomatic of a "failure in symbolic function­
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ing“ can be seen to fit well with Langer*s distinction 
between the sign and the symbol. McDougall*s action symptom 
is a sign, in Langer*s sense, in that it functions to 
signal the existence of conflict in the inner world rather 
than to transform that conflict into a conceptual act of 
thought which can contain and delay action in the outer 
world. For McDougall, the conflict which is signaled is 
pre-verbal and importantly connected with the earliest 
relationship between the child and the mother.
In the first years of life the child com­
municates through signs, chiefly cries 
and gestures, rather than through 
language. And in fact he can only be said 
to communicate by means of these signs to 
the extent that they are understood by 
Another who treats them as communica­
tions. From this point of view it may be 
said that a baby * s earliest reality is 
his mother*s unconscious. The traces of 
this early relationship are not inscribed 
in the preconscious as are those elements 
that have become part of the symbolic 
verbal chain; they have a different psy­
chic position from representations con­
tained in the form of repressed 
fantasies, and thus have little chance of 
seeking partial expression through neuro­
tic symptoms. ...psychic suffering at 
this presymbolic phase is indistinguish­
able from physical suffering, a fact that 
is evident in ... many psychosomatic 
manifestation (1982, pp.252-253).
McDougall thus distinguishes between the action symptom 
as a sign and the neurotic symptom as a symbol. The neuro­
tic symptom is a transformation of a conflict into a con­
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ception which functions to delay and mediate the activity 
connected with it. If activity does ensue (compulsive 
thoughts or actions; hysterical conversion reactions; pho­
bias) it has become a transformation of the conflict; that 
is, symbolic of the conflict, and not merely a signal of 
the existence of conflict. It is a "true" psychoanalytic 
symbol in that the relation between the symbolic act and 
the symbolic activity is not known to the subject.
On the other hand, the action symptom as a sign is part 
of what it signals. It lacks the differentiation between 
vehicle and referent which is the sine qua non of the 
symbol. An important implication for this distinction is 
that the content of the action symptom, being a sign and 
not a symbol, is not interpretable in the same way as is 
the content of the neurotic symbolic symptom. Here, the use 
of speech
has little in common with the 
language of free association.
...[Language is used] as an act rather 
than as a symbolic means of communication 
of ideas or affect. ... Once the nascent 
thought of feeling has been ejected, [the 
analysand] will frequently plunge into 
action of some kind in an attempt to ward 
off the return of the unwelcome 
representation and mask the void left by 
the ejected material. Economically 
speaking such action assures a certain 
discharge of tension, and might be called 
an "action symptom". In this way talking 
itself may be a symptomatic act and 
therefore an “anti-communication" (1982, PP.253-254).
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In McDougall's presentation, this is most clearly seen 
in her description of the psychosomatic character pattern 
and the "meaning" of psychosomatic symptoms. She states 
that psychoanalytic processes are the "antithesis" of psy­
chosomatic processes. She reminds us of Freud’s distinction 
between conversion hysteria and actual neurosis. The former 
Freud considered symbolic of the sexual conflicts of early 
childhood, and the physical symptoms retained their symbo­
lic significance as an unconscious substitute for instinc­
tual satisfaction. The latter Freud saw as related to 
present sexual problems; as such, he considered them "de­
void of symbolic meaning" (McDougall, 1982; p.346).
McDougall classifies the psychosomatic symptom as an 
"action disorder", in that she conceives of it as an
attempt to make substitute ob.iects in the 
external world do duty for symbolic ones 
which are absent or damaged in the inner 
psychic world (1982, p.370).
In psychosomatic structures important representations 
are simply "decathected without compensation" with the 
result that there is little psychic binding through symbo­
lic activity, but a tendency to "inappropriate somatic 
discharge" instead. Although this type of psychic function­
ing is similar to fetishism, it is not synonymous with it, 
in that the psychosomatic patient rarely achieves the 
genitalization of global primitive anxiety about castra­
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tion. Thus, McDougall is not surprised to find a similarity 
in Oedipal constellations between psychosomatic and per­
verse patients. In psychosomatic symptoms, then, transmis­
sion of psychic tension to the soma occurs without the 
mediation of psychic structures to transform that tension 
into symbolic symptoms. And McDougall reminds us that
somatic processes and psychic processes 
are governed by different laws of 
functioning (1982, p.354).
In perversion the meaning of the perverse act as an
action symptom is more subtle and complex because a number 
of other defensive processes are at work, such as projec­
tive identification, splitting, and disavowal. In relation 
to the symbolic function in perverse structures, there is
an avoidance of Oedipal conflict by means of a lack of
symbolization of the paternal phallus. In these cases, the 
symbolic deficit is in a focal and delimited area, although 
one that is central to the development of a stable Oedipal 
structure able to regulate the psychic economy. The failure 
of symbolization leads to a failure in the capacity to
regulate tension, and to the appearance of the action 
symptom. Here, the action symptom functions to regain from 
the external world what is lacking in the inner world: in
the case of the male pervert, the paternal phallus. It is 
still more a sign than a symbol in that it is the same
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phallus which is sought in the external world as is missing 
in the internal world. Little transformation has occurred; 
little conception has occurred; it is simply a matter of 
replacement of one for the other.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION OF THE ACTION SYMPTOM IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE 
SYMPTOM OF DELICATE SELF-MUTILATION 
Introduction
This discussion will take as its starting point the idea 
of "multiple function", first introduced by Walder (1936), 
which limits the logical difficulty of the psychoanalytic 
notion of over-determinedness. Before Walder*s introduction 
of this concept, there was no principle of psychoanalytical 
hermeneutics that could set a limit upon how far over­
determinism reached for any given psychic act. "Over-deter­
minism opens onto infinity, as it were" (Wal­
der, 1936; p.51). The principle of multiple function limits 
the determinedness of each psychic act to eight groups of 
problems, based upon Freud’s (1923) delineation of the 
’structural theory’.
Consequently, each psychic act can and 
must be conceived of in every case as a 
simultaneous attempted solution of all 
eight problems (Walder, 1936, p.49),
even though the attempted solution may be more successful 
for one group than another. Because the complete and simul­
taneous solution to all eight problems is impossible, the 
character of each psychic act is seen to be a compromise.
In this chapter I will discuss the possible meaning of 
the act of delicate self-mutilation from the standpoint of
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the action symptom. Following Walder, this discussion is 
intended to complement, rather than substitute for, the 
existing hypotheses and interpretations in the literature. 
My hypothesis looks at this unusual act from another per­
spective than has as yet been reported in the literature. 
The basis for attempting to find another perspective is 
viewed from the standpoint of the multiple function inhe­
rent in the over-determinism of each psychic act. I will 
put forward a modest suggestion as to how the symbolic 
function can begin to be fit into Walder’s principle at the 
conclusion of this chapter.
Comparison of Delicate Self-mutilators With the Patients
Described by McDougall
I will begin my discussion by comparing the characteris­
tics of the patients McDougall describes with the litera­
ture already reviewed on delicate self-mutilators.
A syndrome of characteristics describing delicate self- 
mutilators has been reported in the literature (see Chapter 
3). Their act has been conceptualized primarily in the 
language of neurotic psychopathology, along with references 
to pre-Oedipal conflicts such as early trauma and disturbed 
early parental relationships. An important precipitant of 
their act is the experience of separation or loss, which is 
followed by a build-up of tension and the absence of the 
capacity to verbalize their affective state. Delicate self­
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mutilation occurs in conjunction with a form of deper­
sonalization in which pain is usually not felt. The act of 
delicate self-mutilation, in phenomenological terms, is 
restorative.
For McDougall, the capacity for symbolic functioning is 
the "coping mechanism" which mediates the inevitable mental 
pain encountered in human life. She sees two events impor­
tantly configuring later psychic development in terms of 
symbolic functioning. The first is the loss of the "magic 
breast-mother" in the pre-verbal period, which results in 
anxiety of a global kind, connected with biological survi­
val. The second is the loss related to the narcissistic 
mortification of the primal scene during the Oedipal pe­
riod, which gives rise to anxiety connected with social and 
sexual integration. Early traumatic loss becomes a global 
menace because anxiety is not mediated through the symbolic 
representation of the sexual organs. Rather, anxiety re­
mains directly connected to somatic and biological exist­
ence. Later loss is felt as anxiety concerning castration, 
a comparatively lesser danger, which is mediated by the 
symbolic representation of the sexual organs.
From McDougall’s perspective, the early traumas and 
severe disturbances in parental relationships reported in 
delicate self-mutilators is grounds for hypothesizing a 
possible deficit in the capacity for symbolization, with
81
concomitant disturbances in a sense of self and, of course, 
in a sense of sexual identity. It is from a population with 
similar histories of early loss and severe disturbances in 
parental relationships that McDougall’s cases of perversion 
and psychosomatic character types come.
McDougall distinguishes three types of tension regula­
tion: repression; the action symptom; and (also a type of
action symptom) the psychosomatic sign. Depression removes 
from consciousness impulses which would lead to unaccept­
able actions. The return of the repressed is a symbolic 
transformation of these impulses into thoughts and actions 
more acceptable to the ego. Because of the symbolic equiva­
lence between the repressed impulse and the symbolic 
thought and/or action psychic tension is released. The 
action symptom releases tension through an action which not 
the result of the transformation involved in repression, 
but appears where repression would appear in the neurotic. 
It is a sign rather than a symbol of a psychic disturbance. 
The psychosomatic sign, a somatic sign of psychic disturb­
ance, occurs when psychic tension is directly transmitted 
to the soma without mediation of psychic structures. McDou­
gall notes that the action symptom serves as protection 
against de-differentiation and loss of identity in the 
absence of a symbolic bulwark to act as protection. In 
repression, which is symbolic, the defensive operation
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protects against loss of sexual identity, such as fears of 
castration. Action symptoms are life-affirming and restora­
tive; the alternative to them is suicide.
All reports of delicate self-mutilation remark upon the 
tension releasing function of the symptom as well as its 
restorative function in the absence of the ability to 
verbalize affect. As to the latter, the frequent reports of 
these patient’s feelings of "emptiness" along with the 
paucity of their object relatedness leads one to speculate 
about whether they lack the ability to verbalize affect or 
whether they lack the normal experience of affect. Perhaps 
connected with this are the confusions, noted in Chapters 2 
and 3 about these patient’s capacity for repression. Affect 
is, after all, clearly stated by Freud to be the more 
important target of repression (Freud, 1915a). In the ab­
sence of these normal (neurotic) affects there would be no 
need for repression.
McDougall sees the perverse act as an essential feature 
of her patient’s psychic stability, as well as noting its 
compulsive and inflexible aspects. It is this latter dimen­
sion that prompts her to state that Freud’s dictum that 
"perversion is the negative of neurosis" (Freud, 1903) is 
not a sufficient explanation of that condition. McDougall 
also notes the lack of fantasy life in both her perverse 
and psychosomatic patients. She sees the fetish as a sub­
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stitute for the lack of representation of the paternal 
phallus, stating "that which is missing in the internal 
world is sought in an external object". This must be sought 
externally because of a "failure in symbolization". This 
distinguishes McDougall*s interpretation from the more 
usual psychoanalytic interpretations which see the fetish 
and perverse acts as substitutes for the missing maternal 
phallus (Freud, 1927; Wulff, 1946; Koiphe and Galen- 
son, 1973. See also Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1985, for an argu­
ment in support of McDougall*s position.)
Delicate self-mutilators are characterized as being on a 
merry-go-round in that each act of self-mutilation leaves 
them once more in the same place, having made no gains 
psychically and remaining as vulnerable to loss and recur­
rence of the symptom as before. Their act functions to 
restore their immediate psychic stability in the face of 
mounting tension without real change in their overall psy­
chological makeup. In addition, the act is compulsive, 
although it appears to have more plasticity than the per­
verse scenario described by McDougall. That is, it is not 
essential that the same object, or even the same type of 
object, is used. In addition, the type and site of the cut 
can vary. However, it has been noted that the object is 
often secreted away, much in the manner of a transitional 
object, suggesting a relationship involving primitive af-
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feet. Defense against primitive affect "differs fundament­
ally from ... repression" (Klein, 1930).
For McDougall psychosomatic creations are the 
"antithesis" of neurotic manifestations. Onlike neurotic 
and psychotic symptoms in which a story may be decoded, 
McDougall finds no such story in psychosomatic symptoms. 
Bather, she describes a psychosomatic character pattern, in 
which object relations lack libidinal affect, thinking is 
"operational”, there is a lack of neurotic symptom forma­
tion, physical pain appears where mental pain would be 
expected, and there is a marked lack of associative mater­
ial. Further, as babies, these patients have had either a 
"tranquillizing" or an absent mother, with resulting dis­
turbances in their later ability to self-regulate.
Comparing this character pattern with delicate self- 
mutilators we do find an inability to verbalize a 'story', 
and have already speculated on whether they do, in fact, 
have the usual affective experiences to verbalize. Their 
overwhelming response to separation and loss, however, does 
not speak to the lack in libidinal affect noted in the 
psychosomatic character pattern. Bather, their libidinal 
affect appears to be intensely and pathologically focussed 
on non-responsive objects, these often being reminiscent of 
parental figures, and leading to the many interpretations 
of masochistic aims noted in Chapter 3. Their lack of
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childhood neurotic symptomology, and their dirth of asso­
ciative material is also well documented. While physical 
pain does not appear to replace neurotic manifestations, 
the act of delicate self-mutilating can be seen to function 
as a replacement for a missing mechanism for tension 
release. Also, the experience of normal physical pain which 
has been associated with the differentiation of self and 
other (Schilder, 1935; Hoffer, 1950) is often attenuated, 
and impulsive dangerous acts leading to painful injury are 
not unusual.
Delicate Self-mutilators From the Perspective of a Symbolic
Deficit
It appears from this comparison that the population of 
delicate self-mutilators has much in common with the popu­
lation described by McDougall. I wish now to look at the 
behavior of delicate self-mutilators from the vantage of 
McDougall’s idea of the existence of a symbolic deficit, 
specifically with reference to the distinction between sign 
and symbol in symptom formation (see Chapter 5).
From a linguistic perspective delicate self-mutilators 
may not use language normally because of a deficit in their 
ability to reliably distinguish linguistic vehicle from its 
referent (Werner and Kaplan, 1963). This would help to 
explain their use of language as 'acts', as well as imply a 
degree of magical thinking as is found in a normal young
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child. This magical -thinking is implied in reports that 
delicate self-mutilator’s expect to be understood without 
their effort to verbalize (see Chapter 3 above).
Further, if the "directedness" inherent in the formation 
of symbols should be missing, this would imply a passive 
role in the way in which they internalize their environ­
ment. This confluence of passivity and impulsive behavior 
is strikingly similar to, from another framework, David 
Shapiro’s (1965) well known explanation of poor Judgement 
in impulsive behavior as a cognitive style which is “defi­
cient in certain active processes" (p.149) as well as being 
"concrete".
In terms of sign and symbol, the use of signs rather 
than symbols implies the passive reception of meaning from 
undifferentiated signs rather than the active creation of 
unique and individual symbols. This could also go further 
in explaining delicate self-mutilator’s magical thinking, 
in that ’meaning’ for them is out there. in signs, rather 
than within them, in the form of symbols. One would wonder 
how elaborated their symbolic play was as children. In 
adolescents, Doctors (1979) reports that her patients used 
graphomotor means of expression often, but produced only 
cliched and stereotypical images. That is, they would copy 
rather than "embody an original, formative power"
(Cassirer, 1935).
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A lack of relatedness to their caretaker in infancy 
would forestall their development of fantasy, thus creating 
disturbances in their relationship to reality (Ry- 
croft, 1956; Winnicott, 1945; Klein 1930). Their inability 
to delay action implies a lack of internalized thought 
processes (Freud, 1917; Piaget, 1962) particularly concep­
tual ones. "Symbols are not proxy for their objects, but 
are vehicles for the conception of them” (Langer, 1942). In 
Langer’s terms, the four essential terms for the symbol: 
subject, symbol, conception and object are not present. 
What is missing is the conception.
Without full conceptual ability the meaning of action, 
like the meaning of words, may be undifferentiated from its 
referent. Rather than standing for, and apart from a refer­
ential meaning, the act and the meaning, the word and the 
meaning, are partially merged. Thus, too, the act of deli­
cate self-mutilation and the meaning of this act may not 
stand separate, as the symbol and its referent, but may be 
as the sign and the signified, partially merged. This would 
imply that the meaning of this act must then be sought 
close to the act, rather than at a symbolic distance from 
it. If the act is thought of as a sign. rather than as a 
symbol, following McDougall, one then needs to find 'mean­
ing' in the act, rather than at a symbolic distance from 
it. This act is thus categorized as conforming to different
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rules 'than does the neurotic or psychotic act, both of 
which use symbols to express wishes and conflicts. Calling 
•the act of delicate self-mutilation an action symptom clas­
sifies it outside of the neurotic framework, and outside of 
the usual analytic modes of interpretation.
Implications For Further Clinical Investigation
By categorizing delicate self-mutilation as an action 
symptom and removing it from the neurotic framework and the 
interpretive tools connected with that framework we are 
forced to decide which analytic tools would be appropriate 
to such a population. We have seen one report (Graff and 
Mallin, 1967) in which touching was added to therapy with 
these patients in order to overcome their inability to use 
verbal means to symbolize their psychological conflict. 
Graff and Mallin state that the cutter’s means of anxiety 
relief are “physical, pre-verbal messages". They conclude 
that for therapy to reach these patients it, too, must be 
through physical, pre-verbal messages.
Another investigator (Grand, 1982) has explored the 
relationship of the role of early body experience to the 
lack of distinction between thought and action in schizo­
phrenia. He reminds us that Freud regarded the ego as “a 
mental projection of the surface of the body" 
(Freud, 1923), and describes treatment of autistic and 
schizophrenic children that focuses upon tactile experi­
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ences in order to shift the function of self-stimulation 
from arousal to “an instrument of intentional and organized 
activity" (Grand, 1982, p.333). He notes that the idea of 
somatosensory stimulation as essential to the development 
of the body image and a cohesiveness in the experience of 
self has often been noted.
What has not been so frequently recog­
nized is the role of self-generated soma­
tosensory experience in the process of 
bolstering a failing sense of self and 
body integrity (p.335).
Under these conditions self-stimulation serves to prevent 
"fragmentation of the body core of the ego" (p.335).
This description, from an investigator who has studied 
neither delicate self-mutilators nor perverse or psychoso­
matic personality patterns, sounds remarkably similar to 
the descriptions reported about those latter patients. It 
would appear to be consistent with the idea that in an 
action symptom a basic developmental task connected with 
the psychological integration of the soma has failed.
The question then of the relative efficacy of words in 
the treatment of this group needs further exploration. As 
well as her explicit reference to her patient’s difficul­
ties expressing their affective state, McDougall implicit­
ly addresses this in her reliance on counter-transferencial 
responses. Her patient’s inability to contain or psychical­
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ly elaborate affect in moments of tension necessitates this 
non-verbal, or unconscious connection as a means of com­
munication. Rather than verbalise affect, these patients 
tend rather to "evacuate" it by unconsciously attempting to 
have the analyst experience the affect instead of them­
selves. McDougall states about a patient of this type:
She did not suffer alone. My own counter­
transference was sorely tried (1982;P.267)
Another area for further study is the idea of the dis­
tinction of the sign from the symbol in other forms of 
psychopathology. For example, eating disorders such as 
bulimia and anorexia involve acts with problematic rela­
tionships to consciousness, as do delicate self-mutilation, 
sexual perversion and psychosomatic manifestations. From 
McDougall*s point of view, these do not fit comfortably 
with classical psychoanalytic symbolic interpretation. It 
may be that these disorders, involving as they do a dirth 
of affect and verbalisation, may be better conceptualized 
from the vantage of the action symptom. To various degrees 
this may be true as well of the addictive disorders, which 
have been seen to be associated with delicate self-mutila­
tion.
At the opening of this chapter I discussed Walder’s 
principle of multiple function. At this time I would like
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to suggest that accommodating the idea of the symbolic 
function to this principle is another area for further 
thought. Walder defines eight problems connected with the 
functioning of the ego. Four of them are placed before the 
ego by the outer world, the compulsion to repeat, the id 
and the superego. The other four problems the ego assigns 
to itself in its active, incorporating aspect toward these 
four agencies. As a beginning to fitting in the symbolic 
function to this principle of multiple function, I would 
suggest that the symbol, as was elaborated in Chapter 4, is 
attached to the ego’s active aspect in assigning itself 
problems, where as the sign is more connected to the ego’s 
passive role as the solver of problems assigned to it. As 
Walder himself states, however, it is only by abstraction 
that these separations may be made.
The last suggestion to be made for further investigation 
is the most general and perhaps the most difficult. If the 
symbol does indeed distinguish humankind from other forms 
of life, as Langer (1942) suggests, then the psychoanalytic 
study of the formation of symbols may do much to help 
explain the elusive concept of ’self’. This could very well 
be attempted from the already important field of psycho- 
analytically informed infant observation and research, and 
would be the psychoanalytic counterpart to the work of 
Piaget (1962) and Werner and Kaplan (1963). Already the
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academic synthesis of the work in symbol formation of Freud 
and Piaget has been attempted by Furth (1983). The value of 
the investigation I am suggesting would be to add addi­
tional empirical support to the field of psychoanalytic 
symbolic interpretation, as well as to clarify the nature 
of the difficult concept of the symbol itself.
One last word is in order about the theoretician who
inspired the hypothesis of this dissertation. Joyce 
McDougall excells at involving the reader in the very human 
interactions between psychoanalyst and patient, and her 
attempt to frame these in theoretical terms results in 
thought-provoking ideas which emanate concentricly rather 
than linearly. While this may, indeed, parallel the 
complexity of human interactions, it also adds complexity 
of its own, and makes comprehension difficult. This
dissertation has attempted to clarify only one of
McDougall’s ideas. It is to be hoped that she and others 
will continue the attempt to theoretically clarify the 
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